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ABSTRACT 
The American University in Cairo 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy 
Department of Public Policy and Administration 
 
CORPORATIZATION OF STATE OWNED PRESS INSTITUTIONS IN EGYPT 
AN ADAPTED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
CASE STUDY: AL-AHRAM 
 
Diana Samir Nosshy Eldaba 
Supervised by Dr. Laila El-Baradei 
 
This study analyzes the published corporate governance guidelines and related documents of the 
BBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian Media Group and Thomson 
Reuters and accordingly creates an adapted corporate governance index suitable for 
implementation on the state-owned press institutions in Egypt with the aim of moving them 
towards a greater degree of corporatization. The notion of the research is that the legislations and 
board structures of state owned press institutions in Egypt don’t fit their mandate and that 
corporate governance needs to be applied to these institutions to make them eligible for market. 
Qualitative content analysis is applied to the studied documents and in depth interviews are 
conducted with ten media and academic experts to realize the proposed index. The study adopts 
three justified approaches, public interest, stakeholders’ benefit and agency governance 
approaches. The index is then applied as an assessment tool to Al-Ahram state owned press 
institution. 
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The study finds that Al-Ahram as well as SOPIs don’t satisfy most of the good corporate 
governance indicators. Board of directors’ mandates, functioning mechanisms, nomination, 
planning, disclosure policies, relationship with the owner and many other aspects fail to meet the 
requirements of a good corporate governance system.  
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i. Introduction 
         All promising official statements about National Press reforms in Egypt fade down on the 
ground of execution... on the ground of heavy debts, absence of credibility, bureaucracy, inflated 
administrative structures and the inherited bad reputation. The problem has always been abridged 
into the question of independence and political intention. Lack of independence and the 
malicious political intent can be seen as the causes of the devastating problem; however they are 
not enough for comprising the problem definition anymore. Behind the accumulated debts there 
is absence of risk management policies and independent auditors. Behind the lack of credibility 
stands the absence of disclosure policies. Behind the inflated bureaucratic structures, there is lack 
of strategic planning and lack of succession planning for senior positions. Behind all the 
problems, stands an inefficient board of directors. Behind the inefficient boards, there are weak 
outdated legislations, and mandates with irrelevant motivators. Accordingly, the main 
assumption behind this thesis is that there is a need for a good corporate governance system to be 
implemented with the State Owned Press Institutions.  
      State-media exists in many countries (CIA, 2015), but they exist in more effective patterns 
that protect them from the deficiencies of the public sector. Although the BBC is a public 
broadcaster that is headed by a Trust that is appointed by the queen on advice of the cabinet 
(BBC, 2015), which practically means that Trust members are appointed by the cabinet; and 
although it is funded by the compulsory license fees paid by the British people (Heath J. , 2014), 
the BBC is a corporation that almost complies with all the British Corporate Governance Codes 
with very few exceptions (BBC, 2014). The National Turkish Radio and Television is called the 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TCF, 2015), despite being funded by tax payers. On 
the other side and in spite of being designed to be self funding and profit making firms, state-
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owned press institutions in Egypt are still structured and run with traditional governmental 
mechanisms that do not fit its set targets and are not eligible to produce competent journalism.   
      This study proposes an adapted corporate governance index that can be applied to the State-
owned Press Institutions in Egypt with the aim of corporatizing these institutions and therefore 
alleviating many of the aforementioned problems affecting their effectiveness and efficiency.  
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Background and Problem Definition   
 
A- Historical Background  
      The problem of national press institutions (NPI) started in 1960, when the former president, 
Gamal Abdulnasser, nationalized the press. Independent journalists became civil servants 
(Elzahed, 2012).  Until this date there hadn’t been any press owned by the state, but there had 
been only state radio and television (Rashwan, 2015). Press nationalization was an 
implementation mechanism of Abdulnasser’s socialist policies. Al-Sadat dealt with the problem 
by delegating the ownership of NPIs to the newly founded Shura Council by that time (Elzahed, 
2012). This transition in ownership was only a nominal action due to the ruling party domination 
over the Shura Council, so the press remained under the direct control of the ruler.  
       All the state’s policies in dealing with the NPIs problems lacked the political will as well as 
the right implementation mechanisms. Most of the reform policies were only provisional 
sedatives to the deep rooted problem, while some policies added more to the problem. Although 
the problem was multi-dimensional it was mainly viewed from the political perspective only.  
 
B- Problem Factors   
 
1- Absence of Independence  
      National Press failed to defend the former President Mubarak, and then turned against him, 
then supported the former president Muhammad Morsi and then turned against him (Kassem, 
2015). These fluctuations show that NP wasn’t loyal to certain principles rather than being loyal 
to whoever is in power.  
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     On the fifth of February 2011 Al-Ahram National Newspaper published for the first time a 
large photo for Tahrir Square in the top middle of its front page and stated in its headline 
“Hundreds OF thousands in Tahrir are asking for change”. And in an act taken as bidding 
Mubarak’s regime goodbye; Al-Ahram issued on the same day a new edition specialized in the 
news of the revolution (Awad, 2013). During the period from the 3rd to the 11th of February, 
2011; Al-Ahram changed its frame and its stance from the revolution; it became more pro 
revolutionaries (Ibrahim E. , 2012, p. 11). Al-Ahram wasn’t an exception, but all the national 
newspapers turned to support the revolution starting from this period. The revolutionary effect on 
the State Owned Press (SOP) didn’t last for long and the national newspapers turned back to be 
the mouth piece of the new regimes as soon as The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took 
over. 
     NPIs are owned by the state, which means shifting to be the mouthpiece of the military 
council in the transitional state then of the former Muslim Brotherhood president, Dr Mohammad 
Morsi, during his presidency (Saed, 2013). This is not a new trend in the NP, but these efforts 
echo the attempts that were made several decades ago in the semiofficial press, when the NP 
denied the reality of the Egyptian Military’s loss to Israel during the 1967 war (Hamdy & 
Gomaa, 2012).  
     Changes in regimes always meant a change in the boards of directors (BOD)s as well as in the 
editorial boards (EB)s of the NPIs.  Six weeks after the resignation of the former president, 
Mohammad Hosni Mubarak; Essam Sharaf, the prime minister thereafter who was appointed by 
the Supreme Military Council, declared significant changes in the editors in chief and the 
chairmen of the NPIs (Alarabiya, 2011). Five weeks after the nomination of the former Egyptian 
president, Mohammad Morsi who was the leader of the Freedom and Justice Party, the new 
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regime declared changes in the NPIs leaders through the Shura council that was dominated by 
the Muslim Brotherhood, at that time (ONTV, 2012). This was followed by changing the 
supreme press council members one month later (Alarabiya Net, 2012). Then the regime 
considered changing the NP chairmen, six months after the 30
th
 of June revolution (Youm 7, 
2013). Six months-time without changes in NPIs leaderships was considered the longest period 
since the 25
th
 of January Uprising. The Supreme Press Council then drafted a new law regarding 
the appointment of the editors in chief of the NPIs (Mekkawy, 2013). Twenty days after the 
election of Marshal Abdelfattah Elsisi as the sixth President of Egypt, the Supreme Press Council 
declared new changes in the editors in chief of the NPIs (MENA, 2014). 
 
2- Declining Circulation and Increasing Financial Burden  
       There aren’t any disclosed official figures, regarding the circulation of National Newspapers 
in Egypt. Circulation numbers are considered a secret and publishing them, despite being 
required by law, is perceived as being of a negative effect on the advertising revenue (Rizk, 
2015). There aren’t official data in this regards; however it has been stated by some officials that 
national newspapers’ circulation is declining (Helal, 2015), without any mention to solid figures. 
According to the former president of Shura council the returns of some national newspapers 
reach 95% (Fahmy, 2013). According to Khalid Elsergany, columnist, weekly circulation of 
some national press publications does not exceed 300 issues (National Coalition For Media 
Freedom, 2012).  
     Other factors add up to the circulation problem. The increase in the number of competing 
privately owned newspapers and the consistent rise in the numbers of internet users in Egypt that 
exceeds 46.2 million according to the Ministry of Communications.  
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      Despite carrying popular brand names, most NPIs have been realizing extravagant losses; 
however there aren’t any available accurate data about their debt accumulations or annual 
budgets. The NPI debts started only with 2.5 billion pounds, and then the figure was multiplied.  
(Rashwan, 2015). According to a parliamentary committee headed by the former Prime Minister 
Ali Lofty in 2007, the accumulated losses and debts of NPIs were declared to be 7 billion 
Egyptian pounds (Abdelaziz, 2011). The former President of Shura Council, Ahmed Fahmi 
stated that NPI losses reached 17 billion pounds in 2013 (Fahmy, 2013). Sources of these debts 
are the advertising taxes and National Security dues that haven’t been paid by former NPIs 
chairmen, due to the political deficiency that gave NPIs chairmen the authority to ignore paying 
the country its dues (Rashwan, 2015). The successive governments dealt with the NPIs 
worsening problem with ad hoc, short-term reactive solutions which did nothing but added to the 
dilemma.   
 
3- Bureaucracy and lack of Accountability 
     Government bureaucracy, lack of proper accountability mechanisms and lack of result 
oriented evaluation processes constitute a fundamental part of the NPIs problems. 
     There are currently 55 National publications in three languages.  NPIs comprise 25000 
employees, among which are the journalists whose number ranges between 4500 and 5000 
journalists. Approximately 60% of the journalists are syndicate members (Rashwan, 2015). This 
relatively big number of public employees works under a bureaucratic system that does not suit 
an industry based on creativity and fast achievements.  
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      The traditional public administration of NPIs lack proper accountability and evaluation 
mechanisms. Chairmen become more of bureaucratic administrators, rather than being result 
oriented public managers who are questioned about the profit making and circulation rates of 
their product. The lifelong contracts for journalists, lack of financial allocations for capacity 
building, the difficulty of new hiring and nepotism are all manifestations of the NPIs 
bureaucracy; and The Supreme Press Council (SPC), that is considered the highest power over 
NPIs, has been committing a major fault by limiting its role to appointing the chairmen and 
editors in chief, while the dilemma of these institutions needs strong actions from its side that 
comprise deep reforms, and administrative as well as financial restructurings (Abdemeguid, 
2013).  
      Taking into consideration all the previously mentioned problems, uncovered corruption cases 
weren’t a surprise. The popular corruption case, known in the media as “Al-Ahram Gifts Case”, 
was a normal result of the absent policies. Precious gifts that were reported to be worth millions 
of pounds were given away by Al-Ahram NPI to the former President, his family members and 
22 other public figures related to his regime (Shorouk, 2013). There wasn’t any obligation on 
NPI chairmen to introduce any explanations to their decisions regarding the expenditures 
allocations.  
        Absence of clear ownership policies contributed to the problem, some argued that this 
ownership model which takes place through The SPC isn’t common in democratic countries 
(Saed, 2011).  Now as there is a new body that will replace the SPC, according to the 2014 
constitution, a vital question needs an answer; what are the guarantees of not replicating the SPC 
model deficiencies in the new body, and how to make a real rather than cosmetic change.  
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    This study contributes with an answer by proposing an adapted corporate governance index 
for NPI governance assessment and problem solving. The assumption is that an adapted 
corporate governance model when applied to the National Press Institutions can contribute to 
alleviating some of its deeply entrenched problems. 
 
Why National Press Institutions Reform is a Priority?  
          In the middle of a tough Egyptian economic situation and political hardships, is reforming 
the national press a priority?   In developing countries this question is highly debatable.   Some 
will argue that poverty reduction, undermining terrorism, security, and education are of a higher 
priority. According to a report published by the World Bank, this short-sighted argument fails to 
take into account the media’s essential role in helping to achieve development and governance 
outcomes. If poor people don’t have the right to express themselves you can’t build public 
consensus (Kalathil, 2011). This study argues that state-owned media should serve the public 
purpose, and be the voice of the vulnerable, and this can be achieved by complying with a good 
corporate governance system.  
Study objective 
      This thesis aims at contributing to solving the Egyptian State-Owned Press Institutions 
(SOPI)s problem by taking a corporatization approach through developing a Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI)  that is applicable to SOPIs. 
        This is a good time to introduce this study while a new SOPIs governing body is being 
established, and new press laws are being proposed in compliance with the new constitution.  
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Why Corporate Governance?  
 
1- To Counter Corruption   
     The Corporate Governance (CG) discipline has recently restored the interest of scholars and 
practitioners due to the popular corporate scandals that were reported in the United States and 
were referred to governance deficiencies (Picard, 2005, p. 1).This lead to re-evaluation of CG 
systems effectiveness in the USA (Kroszner, 2008).  
     Scholars argue that media and specially newspapers In the USA need to overview their CG 
mechanisms due to similar scandals, unclear conflict of interest policies and lack of guarantees 
that journalists are working for the public interest rather than their own self-interest (Arrese, 
2005).  
     Other serious governance related issues like media firms bankruptcies urged the interest in 
media corporate governance. One of the popular media bankruptcies in the USA is the cable TV 
operator Adelphia that was driven into bankruptcy in 2002. 
 
      SOPIs in Egypt have faced similar problems. They witnessed corruption scandals, as those of 
Al-Ahram as well as witnessing critical financial situations that if not for the government’s 
intervention, would have turned SOPIs bankrupt. It is therefore, a necessity for SOPIs to 
consider adoption of CG mechanisms that put clear definitions to the interests of the state as an 
owner and to the public purpose as the main beneficiary as well as setting the needed policies to 
deal with the existing SOPIs problems.  
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2- Governance is needed Rather than Government 
      We need to run our National Newspapers through governance, not government. Government 
is about practicing power while governance is about fulfilling the interests of different actors 
through transparent rules (Nolan & Marjoribanks, 2011). SOPIs should take the public feedback 
and the rights of the vulnerable into consideration in the decision making process. Governance, 
unlike government is not about the control of the ruler as much as it is about the participation of 
the governed (Carioo, 2004) . 
 
3- Clear Ownership Policies are needed  
      One of the main controversies about state-owned media revolves around government control. 
Some scholars argue that state-owned media is a weapon in the hands of ruling regimes who use 
it to limit their opponents (Lauria, 2012). Others consider it a public service that provides the 
right to information to all citizens on equal basis and protects the industry from the control of 
capitalists. Others argue that state media has a vital role, but there are boundaries that keep it far 
from practicing its role as public service broadcasting. Public media should be independent of 
the executive authority (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2010)and ownership 
policies are needed to resolve the complicated relationship between ownership and control. This 
can be realized through corporate governance (CG), because CG is mainly about organizing the 
relationship between the owners and other stakeholders.  
4- To Achieve Press Freedom 
      Vast literature ties media freedom to good governance (Gehlbach & Sonin, 2008). A 
government that respects the rules of democracy gets its strength from guaranteeing the editorial 
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freedom of the public media, thereby accepting that it will sometimes be criticized by state-
sector journalists. (Reporters Without Borders, 2010). CG system must be strictly applied to the 
Egyptian SOPIs in the face of those who promote for state media as a national security subject 
that should be dealt with in accordance with security sensitivities (Elgallad, 2015).   
 
5- To Make Profit 
    The Country must have an information system, but this does not mean it has to spend on it. 
The country is facing hard financial circumstances, so spending on losing newspapers and 
Maspero doesn’t make sense, but these state-owned media entities should make profit. There 
aren’t any accepted justifications for these institutions losses and they can overcome these losses 
under good management (Kassem, 2015). There shouldn’t be any contradiction between being 
public and making profit (Rizk, 2015).  
 
Why do State Owned Press Institutions Need an Adapted Index?  
     This paper does not recommend the application of a ready-made corporate governance index 
(CGI) to SOPIs, out of the notion that a successful governance model can’t function if not 
adapted to its existing context. Governance structures and processes are related to the 
corporations’ environments and differ according to the nation, structures and ownership patterns 
(Picard, 2005).  
 
 
20 
 
Research questions 
The main question is: 
To what extent the application of an adapted set of corporate governance indicators (CGIs) when 
applied to the state owned press Institutions (SOPI) in Egypt can help in alleviating some of their 
deeply entrenched problems? 
 
The answer is realized through the following sub-questions:  
1- What are the corporate governance dimensions of reputable and successful media firms? 
 
2- What are the corporate governance dimensions that are suitable for the Egyptian state-
owned press institutions’ legislative, political and social context?  
 
3- How can these indicators be applied to the state owned press institutions? (What are the 
needed reforms – what is the cost?) 
 
4- To which extent does Al-Ahram State Owned Press Institution comply to the indicators 
of good corporate governance system? 
 
5- What are the main obstacles that prevent Al-Ahram from realizing a good corporate 
governance system?  
 
6- What are the studies needed for deciding upon the right corporate governance policies for 
the state owned press institutions in Egypt? 
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ii. Literature Review 
 
        The literature on governance is very rich with debates. Every minor governance dimension 
constitutes a controversy that has lasted for decades without a definitive answer. The debate goes 
among both, scholars as well as among practitioners and each group has its arguments and 
supportive evidence. Corporate Governance (CG) and Media Governance inherited these 
controversies.  
     
      The literature review of this research covers a wide range of studies. It addresses the studies 
that observe the term broadness and the interpretations variations; and because one of the 
objectives of this study is to counterpart corruption; the literature covers the conducted research 
on good governance and the controversies revolving around it in terms of, descriptions, 
implementation, effectiveness and the debate between the state-centric governance versus the 
beyond-state governance. IT covers as well the development in the definitions of corporate 
governance.  
     The literature review moves to the narrower circle of media governance; as it observes the 
debate between profitability versus independence. It discusses the literature on governance and 
power balance in media firms and addresses many controversies; the controversy between 
business driven media governance models and the hierarchical traditional models as well as the 
controversy between the shareholders and the stakeholders’ models.  
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A- Governance 
 
1- A Broad Term: 
      Most of the literature on governance agrees on one main attribute that characterizes the 
relatively new discipline, which is the broadness of the concept on both the academic and 
practical levels. Governance is a broad concept covering all aspects of the way a country is 
governed, including its economic policies and regulatory framework, as well as adherence to 
the rule of law (IMF, 2015). The two leading political scientists Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters 
described the concept of governance as notoriously slippery and controversial (Pierre & 
Peters, 2000). Some scholars argue that the broad scope of the literature on public sector 
governance is a challenge as well as being an opportunity to researchers. It is an opportunity 
as broadness makes it a rich area for scholars to create new work; however it is a challenge 
because the broadness of the term results in having different meanings among researchers 
(Hodges, 2005).      
        The agreement of most of the literature on the variance of the governance concept 
interpretations means that there is always a chance for new contributions in this topic which 
means that the research topic of this study will necessarily fill a literature gap, the thing that will 
be discussed in more details in the literature gap section.  
 
2- Three Phases of Term Development  
     Although different meanings of governance are used by different authors simultaneously, 
some scholars classify the usage of the different interpretations according to successive phases.  
Kwame and Anis mention that the development of the governance concept took place in three 
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stages; it started with a narrow concept that could be translated into technocratic measures to 
improve government effectiveness. In the second phase the governance had a broader meaning 
that comprised civic participation and social inclusion, and then in the third phase the 
governance concept needs to be developed to be capable of dealing with the political conflicts 
and power sensitivity (Kwame & Anis, 2012).  
 
3- Good Governance 
     Many scholars as well as concerned institutions contributed with definitions and extensive 
researches about what they called “Good Governance”. Good governance is often discussed 
versus corruption. In their book, Good Governance, Rao and N. Bhaskara tackled the issue of 
corruption by providing good governance measures that can be implemented in five years (Rao 
& Bhaskara, 2013). The term is regarded sometimes as a general method to improve government 
(Karpen, 2010).  Other scholars and practitioners use the term (Good Governance) in a wider 
sense; in a book produced by The World Bank about good governance in Africa, Mary McNeil 
and Carmen Manela use the term  (Good Governance) as an equivalent meaning to social 
accountability that comprised participatory budgeting, civic participation in policymaking, and 
enhancing civil advocacy groups (McNeil & Malena, 2010). Using the same meaning, The 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) defined 
8 main characteristics of good governance; being participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable as well as inclusive and follows the rule 
of law (UNESCAP, 2009). These 8 main characteristics will be taken into consideration while 
adapting the introduced corporate governance index to the State-owned press institutions, 
because all of the 8 dimensions are important attributes of successful press corporation.  
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4- Debate on Good Governance Effectiveness 
         Debate on good governance is not limited to differences in the term meanings, but the 
effectiveness of good governance has been questioned and became an issue of debate among 
some scholars, as well; and each group supports his argument with data. Kwame and Anis argue 
that politics and power are not easily addressed by governance reforms asserting that the 
empirical data show weak relationship between good governance and economic growth (Kwame 
& Anis, 2012). In a paper about the Moroccan experience in governance, the researcher 
concluded that the political notion of good governance that was praised by the World Bank and 
international organizations was associated with higher levels of corruption (Maghraou, 2012).  
While Veerle Van Doeveren warns against treating good governance as the only best 
development strategy, however he considers it influential despite being vague (Doeveren, 2014).   
         This stresses on the importance of taking into consideration the elements that weaken the 
good governance effectiveness while developing our CGI. Despite the conduction of many 
empirical studies, many researchers approve of the lack of significant data.  
 
5- Debate on Defining the Good Governance Approach  
    Other scholars agree on the effectiveness of good governance, but disagree on defining the 
good governance approach. Despite the success of governance reforms in Singapore, scholars 
and experts are skeptical about Singapore’s governance model that made economic achievements 
through a state-centric approach (Haque, 2004). On the other side, researchers concerned with 
the European Union Governance issues question the solutions provided to the pressing problems 
by governance that is beyond the state (Kohler-Koch & Ritberger, 2006).  
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B- Corporate governance 
 
     Definitions of corporate governance haven’t been spared from controversy and variation. 
Corporate governance definitions vary widely and have developed over the years. Some 
definitions are mainly concerned with the internal system of the corporate, its behavior, 
performance, efficiency, growth, financial policies, and treatment of shareholders and other 
stakeholders; while other definitions are concerned more with the external rules under which the 
firm operates.   
 
      This study is concerned with reforming the internal system of SOPIs, while the outer 
governing rules, despite being very important, are beyond the study scope.  
 
     Sir Adrian Cadbury stated one of the pioneering definitions that combined the framework 
with the targets and goals; he said that Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the 
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. He 
adds that the corporate governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources 
and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim of corporate 
governance according to Cadbury is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society (Cadbury, 1992) 
      Although the Adrian Cadbury’s definition was descriptive, some of the early definitions of 
corporate governance tended to be wider like that of the Australian national audit office that 
defined corporate governance as a term that   generally refers to the processes by which 
organizations are directed, controlled, and held to account (Australian National Audit Office, 
1999). 
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     Changes in the business and economic contexts were reflected on the corporate governance 
literature and by time definitions started to get more developed. The OECD affirmed that its 
1999 corporate governance Principles should be revised to adapt implementation to changing 
legal economic and cultural circumstances (OECD, 2004). OECD approves the usage of the 
European Central Bank definition. It states that corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organization – 
such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and lays down the rules and 
procedures for decision-making (European Central Bank; OECD, 2004).  
 
    Most of the corporate governance literature focuses on the board of directors and points out to 
it as the key role playing. The Business Dictionary defines corporate governance as the 
framework of rules and practices by which a board of directors ensures accountability, fairness, 
and transparency in a company’s relationship with all its stakeholders ( Vijay Luthra, 2007). In 
the corporate risk management guide, corporate governance is the process carried out by the 
board of directors, and its related committees, on behalf of and for the benefit of the company’s 
stakeholders, to provide direction, authority, and oversights to management. (Sobel, CPA, & 
CIA, 2007).   
  
C- Media Governance  
      The literature is rich with research on countries’ media governing systems, while less 
research is done on the internal governance systems of media organizations. Until now no 
research was conducted on the attributes and comparisons of different governance guidelines in 
media entities nor tested their financial effect (Picard, 2005, p. 5).  
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      The literature on Media corporate governance is scarce, however it is available. It has been 
triggered by the corruption cases and scandals of some media entities. Claims of corruption in 
firms like the Canadian Hollinger Inc. have led to increased discussions of corporate governance 
and the balance of power within media firms (Picard, 2005). Serious governance problems have 
also been evident in media firms as well. It was driven by bankruptcy of  some media firms like 
The U.S. cable TV operator Adelphia that was driven into bankruptcy in 2002  (Gerum & 
Stieglitz, 2005). However, despite the existence of literature on internal governance of media 
firms,   most of it discusses it in a business driven approach that prioritizes profitability rather 
than citizen or public approach.  
1- Profitability versus Independence  
     Ownership patterns were discussed among researchers, but the majority discussed it in 
relation to profitability and few cared about the ownership pattern effect on independence. 
Studies of media firms have shown that they pursue different managerial goals when they are 
publicly owned (Picard, 2005).   
      The effect of public ownership of newspapers on profitability is a subject of big debate 
among scholars; some argued that publicly traded newspapers are less profitable while 
Blankenburg and Ozanich opposed this opinion by saying that the degree of public ownership is 
positively correlated with the financial performance, while others argued that financial 
performance depends on the governance strategy (An & Jin, 2005)  
 
    Little literature discussed the ownership of state to media entities and its effect on 
independence. Luc Van Liedekerke considers that Governance of the state to media is a huge 
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problem. He adds that state regulation spoils the political journalism on a daily basis. He 
concludes that the main questions of implementing media governance models to state media, 
remain unanswered (Luc, 2004).  
 
2- Debate over power balance  
      Other scholars were concerned with the decision making and balance of power inside media 
corporate.  Robert Picard discusses Struggles over strategic decisions and CG structures in major 
media firms—such as Disney and AOL Time Warner (Picard, 2005). In his dissertation Haifeng 
Huang used game theoretic modeling and statistical testing and case studies to study news media 
governance and political control in authoritarian states and he analyzed how authoritarian 
governments use diverse mechanisms to manage the news media not only to maintain regime 
stability but to do reforms as well (Huang, 2009). This brings us again to a critical point which is 
the state-centric governance reform and whether it should be applied on the SOPI reform or not.  
 
    In the decision making context the composition of board of directors (BOD) is always the 
front topic. The composition of the BOD has been one of the most frequently studied governance 
mechanisms (An & Jin, 2005); this it is the centre focus of this study.  
 
3- Market Oriented versus Traditional Models  
  
      One of the common debates in media governance is the debate between business driven and 
traditional corporate governance models. Richard Collins argues that in spite of the liberalization 
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of media and the adoption of government to new public management methods, hierarchical 
governance remains important and plays a major role. He argues that BBC, unlike other publicly 
owned providers and media communication enterprises in England, is not subject to market 
governance.  Collins introduces the BBC governance model as a model which keeps its 
hierarchical system and practices governance transparently at the same time. And he emphasizes 
in his paper about hierarchy, markets and networks in UK media and communications 
governance, that despite the rise of network governance and the move towards markets and the 
attempts to diffuse hierarchical power, the government is still strong and has authority on the 
governance system of the BBC (Collins, 2008).  
 
      Another struggle between the market oriented and public oriented media governance systems 
is reflected in   the book; Media regulation: Governance and the Interests of Citizens and 
Consumers. The authors Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone explain how the UK communications 
regulator OFCOM managed to cope with the speeding changes one of which was the market-
oriented policy regimes. But they criticize the way OFCOM deals with citizenship and criticized 
as well thinking in terms of markets and consumers. (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012 ). OFCOM is 
supposedly set to satisfy what was called the consumer citizen which means it has a governing 
system which compromises between social democratic and market liberal approaches.  Lunt and 
Livingstone emphasized the struggle of satisfying the consumer citizen. They give a useful 
account on the role that OFCOM played in redefining the purposes and characteristics of public 
service after 2004.  And they analyze as well the shift of OFCOM role from policy maker to 
policy taker.  
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       In a book written by media scholars from all over Europe who are members of the Euro 
Media Research Group, they concluded that loss of revenue in the journalism field requires 
publishers to reconsider their business model.  
     One of the significant media business governance models is the Wikipedia corporate model. 
In spite of being portrayed as an unprofessional platform, the researchers Andrea, Vanessa and 
Amy describe Wikipedia organization in their journal article  as an organization with highly 
refined policies, norms and a technological architecture that support organizational ideals of 
consensus building and discussion. (Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009).  They describe how the 
website governance is becoming increasingly decentralized as the community grows. However 
they discovered the inability of wiki project members to enforce their own local guidelines to 
maintain local standard of content production. Although Wikipedia governance model is a 
decentralized business model, however the researchers suggest that one of the reasons of 
remaining healthy is the old timers who carry a set of social norms and organizational ideals with 
them.  
         In practice the separation between business and traditional models isn’t as sharp as in the 
academic literature, but many models are a mixture between the business and traditional systems.  
In their process of identifying the three phases of the evolution of global governance from the 
early logic of the industrial revolution to date, the authors of (Global Media Governance) listed 
the traditional and modern reasons for regulating media both as an industry and as a special 
contributor to political and cultural life. They give a careful description of the formal power of 
governments while discussing market power as well (Siochru, Girard, & Mahan, 2002).   
     A study on media governance and corporate social responsibility in Western European 
countries shows that public service media organizations communicate proportionally more on 
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media governance than private media organizations. The study says that this is due to the fact 
that public service media organizations feel more accountable to the public as they have a public 
service obligation. The study said that Media organizations need to respect a certain degree of 
editorial autonomy of their newsrooms and not to abuse their exceptional position for promoting 
the sale of their own products or services through media coverage in their own media, however it 
is also said that media organizations are economic players as well that pursue business objectives 
and thus focus on efficiency, profit, and market share. They analyzed content data using 
quantitative analysis. (Ingenhoff & Koelling, 2012). This asserts on the importance of adapting a 
new corporate governance index to support the SOPIs in serving the public purpose.  
4- Shareholders versus Stakeholders Models  
    One of the important and relatively new models of media governance is the stakeholder model 
that is usually discussed versus the shareholder model. While scholars who adopt the agency 
approach assert that the exclusive focus of corporate governance is to ensure the interests of 
shareholders, supporters of the stakeholder approach hold onto the notion that corporations 
should serve all groups or individuals who have a stake in the corporation. (Shao, 2009).  
 
    In The Anglo-American tradition, governance structures are shareholder oriented, while in 
continental Europe, many nations have a different stakeholder orientation in which the interests 
of communities, labor, and social organizations in governance are often recognized. 
    Some scholars argue that the stakeholder model leads to a decreased profit and others argue 
that when shareholders are separated from management the profit increases. More will be 
discussed in the theoretical framework. 
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D- Literature gap  
 
    Public demands for attention to corporate governance have led a number of the leading media 
companies to create and disseminate guidelines and policies about governance in recent years, 
but their existence is still not common among media firms (Picard, 2005), while the Egyptian 
SOPIs  lack any corporate governance structure.  
 
       One study partially tackled the governance of National Press in Egypt, but the researcher 
was concerned with assessment of NPIs in comparison to the UNESCO media mandate that was 
taken as a bench mark (Hussein, 2015). The comparison was on the macro governance level and 
did not introduce an adaptation method to the selected benchmark to the Egyptian context, while 
this study argues that corporate governance models can’t be copy pasted, but should be subjected 
to adaptation procedures as the model that can be successful within a certain context might fail in 
another. This study aims at filling this gap by proposing an adapted CGI that can be applicable to 
the SOPIs in Egypt.  
     Another study discussed the international governing media bodies in comparison to the 
Egyptian media governing bodies (Elmasry & Shawky, 2014).  Although this topic is very 
important, regarding governance, because the governing body is the owner representative, but it 
is beyond the scope of this research, however this research strongly suggests that urgent studies 
are needed to tackle the topic of the state as an owner to the SOPIs.  
    By revising the studies directory of the faculty of mass communication in Cairo University, it 
was found that almost all of the studies that tackle NPs are concerned with the content and 
layout; however this study pays the least attention to the content, because CG should be applied 
to corporate regardless of their products.  
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     Therefore this study aims at filling the literature gap by trying to tailor a corporate governance 
index that best fits the SOPIs in Egypt and by providing a model that contributes to the reform of 
the internal control system of SOPIs rather than the editorial system.  
Legal Framework 
 
         Until the submission of this research, there was a regulatory gap in the legislative 
framework of media in Egypt; thus, in the newspapers and national press industry.  
    The Egyptian constitution that was enacted in 2014 resulted in many changes in media 
governance that require major changes in press laws as well as the related articles in the penal 
codes. Most of the media laws became outdated and some of them turned to be unconstitutional; 
the thing that makes this phase eligible to be described as the media lawless phase.      
       Press and publishing activity in Egypt has been governed by many regulations, the legal 
framework consists of constitutional articles, press laws, penal codes, syndicate and unions laws, 
and moral codes (Abdelmeguid, 2001).  
    Sources of media legislations have been numerous and sometimes intersecting. Intersection 
between media regulations sources is manifested in the current situation; as conflicting entities 
are entitled to draft the media law. On the 18th of October 2014, a 24 member committee was 
declared by the press syndicate chairman to be in charge of drafting the new press laws. The 
committee was made up of members from the Supreme Press Council (SPC), the Press Syndicate 
as well as other media experts (Rashwan, 2014) . On the 22
nd
 of October of the same year, the 24 
member committee decided to extend its membership to 50 members to be in charge of drafting 
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all the new media laws.  New members had different expertise as they were selected to represent 
different fields that comprised academics, legal experts, TV and radio experts, chairmen and 
editors in chief of national and private newspapers, and other groups.  Addition of new members 
was based on voting. The 50 members committee should provide the media society with the new 
laws drafts to be widely discussed; then finalized and raised to the president (Rashwan, 2015). At 
the same time the cabinet formed a committee that was said to be an advisory committee for the 
new media legislations. Despite the assertion of the prime minister that the governmental 
committee is consultative, the committee proposed a draft law to the governmental legislative 
reform committee; the thing that was opposed by the Press Syndicate and described as 
unconstitutional (Abdelrehim, 2015) 
       The National press institutions are temporarily governed by the SPC that regulates using the 
constitution, the valid articles of the press laws and penal articles as well as the model 
regulations of the state-owned press institutions (SOPI)s. The regulation process of the SPC is 
restricted by the presidential decree issued by the interim president, Adly Mansur. The decree 
stated that the SPC practices its duties, temporarily until enacting the new constitution, electing 
the new parliament and issuing the needed laws (MENA, 2013). 
A- The Constitution  
         The Egyptian constitution that was enacted in January 2014 comprises 6 
articles that address media regulations, three of them deal specifically with 
state-owned media the other three articles don’t address state -owned media 
directly, however they have an indirect implication on state -owned media.  
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     Under the part of “Public Rights, Freedoms & Duties”, Article (70) addresses the freedom of 
all shapes of media and the right of all Egyptians to establish a media entity only by notification 
(Constitution of Egypt, 2014). This article guarantees a right to the private sector that facilitates 
establishing new media outlets; this means a wider chance for the competitors of state-owned 
media to enter the market. 
      Article (71) prohibits censorship as well as prohibiting suspension of media outlets except in 
times of war and public mobilization; same article refers particular publicity crimes, to the law 
(Constitution of Egypt, 2014). This article guarantees the right of media to freedom, the thing 
that state-owned media should benefit from as it should not imply self -censorship that limits its 
freedom and negatively affects its competency versus private media that enjoys its constitutional 
right to freedom without any censorship.  
      Article (72) directly addresses the National press and media independence, ensuring their 
neutrality and presentation of all opinions, trends and social interests (Constitution of Egypt, 
2014). This article is Unprecedented as this is the first time to put a clear article that stipulates 
state-owned media independence from government in the Egyptian constitutional history. Article 
(72) gives the right to any person or group to litigate against unequal representation in state-
owned media (Rashwan, 2015).  
      Under chapter 10, The Supreme Council for the Regulation of Media; article (211) states the 
mandate of the new body as a regulator of all media types. The mandate includes protecting 
media freedom and independence as well as its neutrality, plurality and diversity; and preventing 
monopolistic practices (Constitution of Egypt, 2014).  Many experts see that the role of state-
owned media is to save the industry from the monopoly of private sector, but still when it comes 
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to monopoly there are still other aspects like governance of advertising revenue distribution and 
monopoly of publishing services.  
    One of the most important mandates of the new regulatory body, as stated by the constitution, 
is monitoring the legality of funding of press and media institutions as well as ensuring their 
compliance with professional and ethical standards, and national security needs (Constitution of 
Egypt, 2014). Despite the importance of the compliance of  media in general and state-owned 
media in particular with national security needs as stated by the constitution, but still this elastic 
term might lead to a legal loophole that gives the chance of limiting media freedom and 
neutrality. 
     The mandate of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation shows that this council is the 
replacement of the ministry of information. The constitution asserts clearly on the new council’s 
independence on all aspects, technically, financially, and administratively.  
      Article (212) states the mandate of the National press organization (NPO). The stated 
mandate means that the new organization is the replacement of the SPC.  It is defined by the 
former press syndicate chairman, Diaa Rashwan, as the general board of the state-owned press 
(Rashwan, 2015). The constitution affirms on the NPO independence and states its mandates that 
comprise managing the SOPIs and their assets and to ensure their modernization, independence, 
neutrality and adherence to professional standards.  
     Article (213) stipulates similar mandate to the National Media Organization that is in charge 
of managing the state-owned visual, audio, and digital media outlets (Constitution of Egypt, 
2014). 
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     The replication of the term (state-owned) media was deliberate as it means that the national 
press institutions are owned by the country and that the ownership rights are practiced through 
the Supreme Council for the Regulation of Media, according to the constitution. This does not 
mean that the state does not have the right to privatize some of these institutions (Rashwan, 
2015).  
     The assertion of the new constitution on the ownership of the state to the national press and 
on its independence at the same time puts a real challenge to the new press laws legislators as the 
new regulatory body; i.e.; The NPO must represent the owner which is the state and at the same 
time must be independent from the executive authority.   
 
B-Press laws  
    Until the submission of this research the press law 96 of 1996, Journalists syndicate law No. 
76 of the year 1970, Imprints Law No. 20 for the year 1936 as well as the old articles related to 
publishing crimes in the Egyptian penal code were still in action. The press law 96 of 1996 
includes 81 articles and It is the main law regulating journalism as a profession (Abdelfattah, 
2010), however many of the law articles should be omitted and others should be amended 
according to the new constitution that was enacted in 2014 (Hany, 2015).  
    The new constitution distributes the responsibilities of the SPC between the Supreme Council 
for the Regulation of Media and the NPO; it comprises as well many other changes in regards to 
the governance of National press. A new law is needed to comply with the new constitutional 
articles.   
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      According to the 2014 constitution, the new law is required to regulate issuing the 
newspapers by notification as well as regulating establishing online newspapers (Constitution of 
Egypt, 2014), as the 1996 law deprived individuals from ownership and establishment of papers 
and did not solve the problem of the procedures of obtaining the license of issuing a new 
newspaper (Abdelfattah, 2010). The constitution limits media censorship to the times of war and 
general mobilization (Constitution of Egypt, 2014) while the 1996 law adds “in the case of 
emergencies” (Abdelfattah, 2010).  
    Article (71) in the 2014 constitution prohibits freedom-restricting penalties in publishing or 
publicity crimes (Zayed, 2014), the former president, Mohammad Morsi, as well issued a 
presidential decree that prevents imprisoning journalists on remand (Al-Ahram Al-Masaei, 
2012); while the 1996 press law states imprisonment as a legal punishment for publishing 
crimes, like refraining from publishing correction to false news (Abdelfattah, 2010). The 
constitution states that the law should stipulate the penalties of crimes that are related to 
incitement of violence, discrimination between citizens, or impingement of individual honor 
(Constitution of Egypt, 2014).  
    Among the vital additions that are required from the new press law is determining the 
composition, regulations and employment conditions for the staff of the NPO, while other media 
laws are required to determine the composition regulations and employment conditions for the 
staff of the Supreme Council for The Regulation of Media, and the National Media Organization. 
Thereby, the chapter of the SPC shall be completely omitted due to the cancellation of the 
council, as well as the supreme press council law.  
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     Regarding the Imprints Law, the Law No. 20 for the year 1936 is still in action. This law 
regulates printing, including newspapers printing. Many articles are expected to get amended, 
especially the articles that address the notifications procedures as article (3) of the law states that 
each printer should notify the government in writing, before printing any newspaper and 
according to article (20) the newspaper publisher should send 6 issues to the ministry of interior 
directly after the printing (Abdelfattah, 2010). These articles as well as other articles are 
expected to be subjected to omissions and changes to abide by the 2014 constitution and comply 
with the independence stated by the constitutional articles (Hany, 2015).  
     Until the moment of submitting this research it wasn’t decided whether the new press laws 
will result in changes in the mandate of the press syndicate or not. Any changes in its mandate 
will require amendments in the journalists syndicate law no. 76 of the year 1970 that is still in 
effect. The syndicate law hasn’t been amended since 1970 (Abdelfattah, 2010). Amendments 
might take place in the penal code articles to abide by the constitutional changes.  
     All of this shows that major changes will take place in the legal framework of SOPIs, which 
gives a chance for making changed in the internal governing systems of these institutions, 
however if these changes were limited to adaptation to the old laws to the new constitution, 
without a core change, then no major changes will be expected on the ground.  
Research Goals: 
His research has three main goals:  
1- To Define the most suitable CG index that best fits the context of SOPIs in Egypt 
2- To Explain and test the implementation chances and limitations of these indicators 
3- To ass Al-Ahram SOPI using the proposed index  
40 
 
iii. Methodology and Conceptual Framework 
 
Methodology  
 
This study depends on secondary data, in depth interviews and qualitative content analysis, as 
shown in the following diagram: 
 
 
Figure 1Diagram Conducted by the Researcher to explain the Research Steps 
 
A- Research Steps: 
 
1. CG codes and guidelines of successful and well established media firms, Press, TV, 
Radio and News Agencies, are analyzed into good governance indicators.  
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2. Then these indicators are discussed with practitioners and experts with respect to the 
legal framework of SOEPIs in Egypt.  
3. After the in-depth interviews with experts, the good CG indicators are narrowed down 
and modified to an adapted CGI suitable to be applied to the SOPIs in Egypt. 
4. Al-Ahram SOPI is assessed against the developed CGI  
5. Public policies and recommendations are proposed consequently 
 
B- The Following Tools were used: 
 
1- Secondary Data  
   This research mostly depends on secondary data. The researcher collected data only in the case 
study as no appropriate secondary data were available about Al-Ahram internal governance 
system.  
      The secondary data were mostly corporate governance (CG) documents of different media 
firms, like governance guidelines, codes and annual reports. 
 CG records of other firms  
 The record of the Egyptian press legislations and SOPIs codes  
 The Egyptian Code of CG  
     The study’s models were selected according to specific criteria that include but are not limited 
to the availability of CG records of the firm. The selection criteria included; years of operation, 
being successful, well established international reputation. Based on these criteria the chosen 
models were; The Washington Post Company, The New York Times Company (NYTC), The 
Guardian Media Group (GMG), The British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) and Thomson Reuters 
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Corporation. They were selected for the following reasons; The Washington Post was founded in 
1877, which makes it the oldest newspaper in Washington DC (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015)  
and it is one of the top 10 circulated newspapers in the United States (Beaujon, 2014). The New 
York Times has started since 1951 and won 114 Pulitzer Prizes, this numbers exceeds any other 
news organization (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015). NYT has a high circulation that makes it 
reach the second place in the top ten list of the highest circulated newspapers in the USA 
(AP).Added to this that the NYTC is concerned with CG, and has full records disclosed on its 
website. The Guardian is considered among the leading British newspapers, it was founded in 
1821 and it is owned by The GMG that is able to achieve financial stability to the newspaper 
(Britannica Encyclopedia , 2015) It is  one of the top 10 newspapers in Britain (Beaujon, 2014). 
The BBC is selected as the only reference for this study for a state-owned media firm that is 
corporatized and that functions under CG system, with the aim of having an independent BOD. It 
has been operating since 1922 and was chosen for the wide international reputation of its radio as 
well as TV channels, as well. Thomson Reuters News Corporation is chosen for this study as a 
relatively new media corporate model, as Reuters was established in 2008 and it is now operating 
in more than 100 countries. Reuters was chosen as the Canadian leading corporate brand in 2010 
(Indeed.co.UK, 2015).  
 
2- In Depth Interviews 
      In-depth interviews were conducted with 10 practitioners and experts. They are divided s 
follows: Five Senior media practitioners, 3 board members of Al-Ahrma and 2 academics. The 
interviewed experts were selected according to their established careers and experience.  
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    The media experts and practitioners included; Hisham Kassem; former Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and publisher of Al-Masry Al-Youm, Diaa Rashwan; the academic researcher, 
journalist and the former press syndicate president (2013-2015), Hamdy Rizk, the chairman and 
CEO of Akhbar Al-youm SOPI, Magdy El-gallad, the editor in chief of Al-watan Private 
Newspaper and the former editor in chief of Al-masry Al-Youm, and Mohammad Hany, the 
former managing editor of Rose Al-Youssef National Magazine and the current President of 
CBC Channels Network.   
     The assessment of Al-Ahram is based on three in depth interviews with three of the board 
members. Mohammad Yaser Farahat, Al-Ahram General Manager and an appointed board 
member, Ezzat Ibrahim, Al-Ahram editorial manager and appointed board member and 
Mohammad Galal, an elected board member representing the labor.  (Check the annex for 
interview instrument – Appendix 1)  
 
3- Content Analysis 
     Content analysis is conducted on the CG documents of the selected media firms, Egypt Code 
of Corporate Governance, the OECD corporate governance code for state-owned enterprises 
(SOE)s beside the SOPIs legislations and internal regulations. The content analysis takes a 
comparative approach as the governance systems of media forms are sometimes compared to 
each other then compared to the SOPIs system and the regulating laws.  
     The analysis is conducted with the aim of reaching the most appropriate CG index to the 
SOPIs in Egypt.  
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4- Case Study  
      Al-Ahram National Press Institution is selected as a case study. Al-Ahram is regarded as the 
biggest State owned press institution in Egypt. It was founded in 1876 as a private organization 
and remained privately owned until it was nationalized in 1960. Al-Ahram produces 28 
publications that range between daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly. It comprises 1700 
journalists. Al-Ahram is almost the only SOPI that makes consistent profit. It was financially 
affected after the 25
th
 of January uprising, however still the annual advertising revenue exceeds 
one billion pounds (Ibrahim E. , 2015)  which is suggested to be the highest among SOPIs.  
     Al-Ahram comprises a number of entities that include, but not limited to; a vast 
printing house that sells printing service to almost all the privately owned newspapers; 
Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Canadian University and Al-Ahram 
Advertising Agency. 
     The researcher didn’t manage to conduct an interview with the chairman of Al-Ahram, 
but quarter of the board; 3 elected and appointed members who represent three different 
sectors; were interviewed, as previously explained.  
     Despite the hugeness of the organization, the case study shows that Al-Ahram is 
operated in a primitive administrative way that lacks good corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
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Conceptual Framework  
        The topic of this study is full of controversies as shown in the literature review section. 
Controversies were reflected as well in the experts and practitioners interviews that showed 
different perceptions regarding the role of the SOPIs and the role of the BODs. Hence setting a 
solid conceptual framework to the study was a necessity that helped in deciding among wide 
range of variables. The conceptual framework is mainly composed of the selected theories and 
approaches; and the key concepts definitions.  
 
A- Theories and Approaches 
1- Ownership Theories  
 
       The academic and policy debate on state-owned media is endless. Some scholars, politicians, 
experts and practitioners see public media as the government’s solution to rescue the society 
from information monopoly and capitalists domination over media, while others believe that 
public media is not a mean for undermining capitalists’ domination but on the contrary they see 
it as a disguised mean for regimes political sovereignty. Both sides have their academic, 
historical, and political as well as economic proves and justifications and each group leans upon 
a theory.  
Public Interest Theory versus Public Choice Theory  
 
       When it comes to media ownership there are two main conflicting theories; The Public 
interest theory versus the public choice theory.  
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The Public Interest Theory (Pigouvian Theory): 
      Many studies were done mainly by political scientists and economists to explain the public 
interest theory, however no consensus was reached and there is still a wide range of varying 
interpretations to the theory. This variance is stemming from the difference in definitions of what 
the public interest is ( sammte , 2011). The “public interest” is a term that can be defined in 
several ways (IESS, 1968). The “Public Interest” is mostly defined against what is called “the 
Selfish interest” (Bisiness Dictionary , 2015) or “Self -Interest” (IESS, 1968). From this point the 
debate starts; the word “Public” should be inclusive to the whole society (IFAC, 2012) and this 
how the Public Interest theory supporters define it; however other groups see that the Public 
Interest is a cosmetic term used by politicians to promote policies that are for their own “self-
interest”. In economics, the public interest theory considers government regulation as the 
instrument to overcome the imperfect market (Hertog, 1999), on assumption that markets act 
inefficiently if left alone (Ponser, 1974).  
    State-owned media, according to this theory is acknowledged, provided that information is a 
public good and private media serves the governing classes while state media will provide more 
neutral and precise information to the public (Begoyan, 2009).  
     This argument about media ownership has started by the BBC management in defense to their 
monopoly of the British broadcast, then was transferred to other countries (Djankov, Mcliesh, 
Menova, & Shleifer, 2003) 
The Public Choice Theory 
    Unlike the public interest theory, public choice theory conceives that state owns media to 
prevent citizens from making informed decisions by information manipulation. This theory 
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supposes that private media provides citizens with divergent set of views and gives equal 
chances for all political opponents with fewer worries from unethical dominators. This is how 
public choice theory defines competitive media and considers this as the only way for settling 
democracy (Djankov, Mcliesh, Menova, & Shleifer, 2003).    
 
The selected theory 
 
        This thesis is concerned with the Egyptian national press that is defined by the 2014 
constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt as state-owned press; hence the theoretical 
framework of this paper is based on the support of public media presence.  
    As Ponser relates the main problem of the theory to its lack of legislative mechanism (Ponser, 
1974), our application to the public interest theory is conditioned by the application of a good 
institutional governance system that achieves the needed reforms and organizational 
development. 
     Provided that the significance of the term “public interest” is normative rather than analytical 
(IESS, 1968), our theory selection is conditioned, as well by the presence of public media in a 
competitive media market that has an equal opportunity for the private sector, the thing that 
means partial implication of the “public choice theory”. This can be implemented when public 
media constitutes a minor share of the industry and this can be realized by minimizing 
investment limitations in the media industry and by making media a safe industry for interested 
investors (Kassem, 2015) 
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     The public choice approach meant rejecting all the opinions that are against state-owned 
media; however the criticism driven by this group was taken into consideration while adapting 
the proposed corporate governance index (CGI) as it aimed at getting rid of usage of SOPIs as a 
political tool in the hands of the governing regimes.  The Public choice approach as well urged 
the researcher take the OECD corporate governance codes for state owned enterprises (SOE) s as 
a main guiding reference, rather than that of the private sector. Added to this, the BBC was 
sometimes taken as the principal model among the other selected media firms models, because 
BBC puts the public purpose as its main target. Consequently the term “Corporatization” rather 
than “Privatization” was chosen to describe the aim of this study which is corporatization of 
state-owned press institutions. 
 
2-  Corporate Governance Theories  
   There are several theories in corporate governance, some of them are conflicting and others can 
be regarded as complementary, and usually the governance system of a corporate is a hybrid 
system that comprises two theories or more.  
 
The Agency Theory versus the Stewardship Theory 
The Agency Theory 
    The debate on corporate governance dates back to the 1930s, when Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means published their book, "The Modern Corporation and Private Property". They indicated the 
negative consequences of ownership and control separation that result in dispersion in ownership 
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that does not have a proper chance to oversee the executive board efficiently.  Berle and Means’s 
ideas were developed until were formulated in the 1970s in a theory known as The Agency 
Theory (Roberts, 2015).  
     The agency theory stands for the notion that the corporate managers will not work for the 
benefits of the shareholders, but will opt for their own benefit and prefer their self interest to the 
shareholders’ interest (Fauziah & Yusoff, 2012). The corporate that takes the agency theory as a 
reference to their governance system will probably have on their board of directors a CEO with a 
separate mandate than the chairman, as well as a large number of non-executive directors 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991) 
 
The Stewardship Theory  
     The “stewardship theory” holds that managers can act as independent stewards on the 
company that runs under their control.  Donaldson and Davis developed this theory (1991 & 
1993) as a new means for reframing the relationship between management and ownership 
(Pastoriza & Ariño, 2008).  
     Unlike the “agency theory” that takes an economic approach to management, the 
“stewardship theory” is influenced by sociological and psychological approaches (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donald, 1997). This theory assumes that interests of both managers and owners 
can be aligned together and denies any conflict of interest between them as far as a right 
governance mechanism is maintained (Pastoriza & Ariño, 2008).  
    Thus the structures that are based on the stewardship notion are structures that focus on 
facilitation and empowerment more than monitoring and controlling (Davis, Schoorman, & 
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Donald, 1997, p. 26). Implication of “stewardship theory” supports CEO duality; i.e. the chief 
executive officer plays the role of the chair as well. Stewardship based governance practitioners 
believe that CEO duality leads to higher return to shareholders. 
 
The Selected Theory 
        Before selecting the approaches of this study, we needed to ask first what are the commonly applied 
approaches and theories. There might not be clear set of approaches that are currently applied in an 
organized manner, but we needed to observe and describe the currently applied systems. The internal 
governing system of SOPIs in Egypt can’t be described as a governance system, but if we are to 
name an applied theory or approach to the current system we can describe it as stewardship 
approach rather than agent approach. 
      It is observed as stewardship oriented system as none of the state-owned organizations has a 
chief executive officer (CEO) or independent directors on its BODs. Added to this is The SOPIs 
general assembly composition. General assembly in the private sector is supposed to comprise 
the shareholders, but in SOPIs it is composed of elected and appointed journalists and 
administrative employees. This all indicates a strong occurrence of the stewardship approach.  
    Before deciding upon the study approach, two questions are posed: The first question; is the 
current system successful? The answer is no, given the financial as well as credibility situation of 
National newspapers in Egypt. The second question is; is the stewardship approach the reason 
for the national press failure? A scientific answer for this question is beyond the scope of this 
paper, however, as a rule of thumb we can claim that it is part of the problem and this claim is 
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supported by the experts and practitioners statements as most of our interviewed experts put a 
blame on the governing system as will be shown in later sections.  
         From this point, the aim of this study is not to terminate the stewardship approach 
completely, but to start applying the agency approach, gradually and whenever possible.  
     Selecting the stakeholder approach, this study rejects defining the objective of state-owned 
media as promoting the state’s policies and suggests governance indicators that urge defining 
ownership policies that consider the state as an owner only one stakeholder among other 
stakeholders that the board of directors needs to satisfy.  
 
The Shareholder versus the Stakeholder Theories  
The Shareholder Theory  
      This theory opposes the notion of business benevolence claimed in what the private sector 
calls “corporate social responsibility”. Martin Friedman, the father of the shareholder theory 
believes that businesses obligation is limited to profit maximization excluding all moral or social 
responsibility aims (Clorado University , 2015). 
    According to this theory, a corporate is an artificial person that can’t have responsibilities as 
responsibilities are only carried by real human beings (Friedman, 1970). This theory complies 
with the agent theory as, given that the corporate targets are limited to profit, the corporate 
executive is directly liable to his employers and is responsible to run the corporate according to 
their desires that will most probably be to achieve the maximum profit  (Friedman, 1970).  
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     Shareholder approach was called by its opponents, an intellectual fantasy. Although the 
shareholder theory was the new Bible of business that was adopted by businessmen, economists 
as well as politicians, a decline in its returns uncovered another face to its notion as seen by some 
analysts. 
     It was criticized for considering the corporate executive as employee of the shareholders, 
while according to the law the corporate executive is an employee of the corporation. According 
to theory critiques the shareholder approach resulted in explosion in CEO compensation and 
decline in corporate performance and shareholders profit consequently (Denning, 2013).  
The Stakeholder Theory 
 
    Critics of the shareholder approach stand for its opposing alternative, the stakeholder theory. It 
argues that corporate performance betters when a governance system is applied to balance 
between diverse stakeholders interests (Waldkirch, 2008).  
   The stakeholder theory is defined by its creator Edward Freeman as the success path for any 
business by benefiting all stakeholders, employees, owners, clients, societies, and other 
stakeholders. It stands for the notion that looking at the stakes of each party, separately, is a 
wrongdoing, because the interest of all of them should be treated together to go in one direction 
(Freeman, 2009) 
    Critics of the stakeholder theory describe it as paradoxical. Their argument is based on the 
management fiduciary to multi stakeholders, suggesting that this can be solved by the managers’ 
performance of duties to all stakeholders and limiting the fiduciary duties to the shareholders 
only (Goodpaster, 1991) 
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The Selected Theory 
 
      If we are to name the currently applied approach for state owned press governance, it will be 
the shareholder approach, because as it is shown in the problem definition section, the owner, 
which is the state, is the fundamental actor within these institutions that proved lack 
independence. 
     The new enacted constitution states that SOPIs are independent. This gives a chance for a 
new approach to be genuinely applied, which is the stakeholder approach. Most of media experts 
as well as practitioners support this approach.    
     Selecting the stakeholder approach, this study rejects defining the objective of state-owned 
media as promoting the state’s policies and suggests governance indicators that urge defining 
ownership policies that consider the state as an owner only one stakeholder among other 
stakeholders that the board of directors needs to satisfy.  
      The currently prevailing approach in the management system of SOPIs tends towards the 
stewardship theory; and since this study adopts incrementalism in policy making, it does not 
suggest adopting the agency theory all of a sudden.  The stewardship theory accordingly will not 
be completely rejected; however its application will be accompanied by gradual application to 
the agency approach as practically a good effective and efficient governance system comprises 
several theories (Fauziah & Yusoff, 2012).  
    This hybrid selection is based on the fact that there are no executives who are purely stewards 
or purely agents, but every person acts with some degree of benevolence and some degree of 
self-interest (Pastoriza & Ariño, 2008) 
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Based on this a stakeholder theory is selected while considering the state as the owner one of the 
multiple stakeholders.  
 
B- Operational Definitions of Key Concepts  
      There are several perceptions and interpretations to the key concepts used in this study; it is 
therefore useful to identify the definitions that best describe the purpose of their utilization. The 
selection of these definitions is made with respect to the adopted theories and governance 
approaches.   
1- Corporatization  
    It is the practice of reorganizing state owned firms to resonate the structure of a publically 
owned corporation. The restructuring of the state organization is generally not publicly traded as 
the state is the only shareholder (Business Dictionary) 
    The researcher rejected the definitions that considered corporatization a mean for turning 
state-owned firms into publicly traded corporation, although this might be one of the 
consequences or suggested solutions for SOPIs problems, but it is not the main target of the 
proposed CGI.  
 
2- Corporate Governance 
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    Corporate governance is the procedures and processes according to which an organization is 
directed and controlled. The CG structure identifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among the different actors in the organization – such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making.  
    This definition is proposed by the European Central Bank and adopted by the OECD. AS the 
study adopts the stakeholder approach, it rejected all the definitions that limit CG as the process 
of organizing the relationship between board of directors and shareholders.  
 
3- State-Owned Media  
     State-owned media are all the media firms that the state owns solely while practicing its 
ownership rights through an independent body to keep the media objectivity.  
    This broad definition is conducted by the researcher, as until this moment there is no 
consensus among media experts and academics about the objectives of state-owned media. It is 
therefore recommended for a wide discussion to take place among the society and the elites to 
define the objectives of state owned media to be capable of putting a more precise definition.  
 
 
iv. Findings: The Proposed Corporate Governance Index and Application 
to Al-Ahram 
 
        Privatization of State Owned Press Institutions (SOPI) s has always been a suggested 
solution for the devastating problem of SOPIs. However, the current context doesn’t show any 
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intension for privatizing the SOPIs. According to the media expert and publisher, Hisham 
Kassem, SOPIs can’t be privatized right now, because the brands are dead (Kassem, 2015). IT is 
therefore the notion on which the CGI is proposed is that corporatization of SOPIs could be an 
alternative answer. Corporatization is a method of applying the corporate system of the private 
sector to public enterprises instead of privatizing them (Wei, 2002 ), walking in the steps of the 
BBC that has a published protocol under the title of “Incorporation of the BBC” (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
     By analyzing the Corporate Governance (CG) documents of the British Broadcast 
Corporation (BBC), The Washington Post Company (WPC), The Guardian Media Group 
(GMG), The New York Times Company (NYTC), and Thomson Reuters Corporation; as well as 
the OECD code for state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the Egypt code for CG, 46 CG indicators 
were proposed. By discussing them with experts and relating them to the SOPIs context, they 
were narrowed down to 27 indicators. The selected indicators are divided according to 5 
dimensions: 1) Board Composition and Operation 2) Strategic planning and policy making 3) 
Transparency and disclosure 4) Code of Conduct 5) Audit  
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First Dimension: Board Composition and Operation  
1. Presence of Corporate Governance Committee 
2. Explicit BOD Mandate  
3. Explained CEO and Chairman Offices Policies 
4. Inclusion of Independent Directors in the BOD 
5. Effective Board Size Boards  
6. Term limit Policies  
7. Specified qualifications for directors selection  
8. Board dismissal policies 
9. Supervision, communication and access mechanisms  
10. Regularity of Meetings 
11. Effective BOD committees 
12. Transparent nomination process of board members  
Second Dimension: Strategic Planning & policy making  
13. Adoption of Strategic plan 
14. Risk Management Policies 
15. Clear Ownership Policies  
16. Board succession plan  
17. Continuing education opportunities for directors  
18. Competitive BOD Compensations  
19. Value creation for all stakeholders  
20. Clear SOP stated mission 
21. Clear corporate governance approach  
Third Dimension: Transparency and disclosure  
22. Information Provision to Board Members  
23. SOPI disclosure policies  
 
Fourth Dimension: Code of Conduct  
24. BOD Conflict of Interest  
25. Policy  Code of Business conduct  
 
Fifth Dimension: Evaluation and audit  
26. BOD Effective Evaluation   
27. Internal Audit Independence  
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Indicators selection and validation 
      The steps introduced by an IFC study to build a successful corporate governance index, are 
taken as a reference for building the adapted CGI. The steps included; Consulting experts, 
putting objectives, choosing an approach, putting criteria that are different that the standard 
criteria and developing the index (IFC, 2013).  
        Analysis of the corporate governance documents of media firms resulted in 46 indicators 
that were narrowed down to 27 indicators.  
    Indicators selection and validation was based according to the SOPIs nature, context and 
targets. Some indicators were combined together as one indicator like the board’s authority to 
review and amend governance, and the existence of a governance committee, as the existence of 
a board committee that is responsible of reviewing and assessing the governance system within 
the SOPI means indirectly board’s authority to review and amend governance. Other indicators 
weren’t suitable for the SOPIs nature and context, like policies of holding shares among 
directors, the things that can’t be applied to SOPIs; and availability of Trust Principals, as in 
SOPIs there is no Trust. The indicator of “Identified dedication degree to board membership” 
was omitted as well, because still SOPIs don’t even have independent directors, therefore this 
indicator might be added later on after a fundamental change takes place.  
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Application to Al-Ahram 
     The indicators are used to assess Al-Ahram SOPI. 
    Al-Ahram National Press Institution is selected because it is regarded as the biggest State 
owned press institution in Egypt. It was founded in 1876 as a private organization and remained 
privately owned until it was nationalized in 1960. Al-Ahram produces 28 publications that range 
between daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly. IT comprises 1700 journalists. Al-Ahram is 
almost the only NPI that makes consistent profit. It was financially affected after the 25
th
 of 
January uprising, however still the annual advertising revenue exceeds one billion pounds 
(Ibrahim E. , 2015)  which is suggested to be the highest among NPIs.  
     Al-Ahram comprises a number of entities that include, but not limited to; a vast printing house that 
sells printing service to almost all the privately owned newspapers; Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies 
and Al-Ahram Canadian University. Despite the hugeness of the organization, Al-Ahram is operated in a 
primitive administrative way that lacks efficiency.  
       An Assessment to Al-Ahram board of directors is provided here, against the 27 adapted indicators. 
The assessment is based on three in depth interviews with three of the board members, which is almost 
quarter of the board members: Mohammad Yaser Farahat, Al-Ahram General Manager and an appointed 
board member, Ezzat Ibrahim, Al-Ahram editorial manager and appointed board member and Mohammad 
Galal, an elected board member representing the labor.  
 
 
 
 
60 
 
First Dimension: Board Composition and Operation 
Indicator1: Presence of Corporate Governance Committee  
 
A- Description: 
 
      Applying corporate governance system to public entities in Egypt and to SOPIs, in specific, 
isn’t common. An important guarantee to maintaining the new system and developing it when 
needed is to have a corporate governance committee among the organizational committees. The 
mandate of this committee differs from corporate to corporate and from country to country, and 
some corporations don’t have it; however it is vital for the SOPIs.  
     One of the main features that corporate governance systems should be characterized woth is 
flexibility and self-adjustment with the aim of reaching the planned targets; i.e. to be result 
oriented. Having an internal committee in charge of over viewing governance mechanisms 
application and periodically suggesting the needed changes in the corporate governance rules 
accordingly, fulfills this self-adjustment requirement. 
     One of the first corporate governance committees was an external committee that was 
established upon the recommendation of Sir Adrian Cadbury and Greenbury committees (1995). 
The role of this committee was to review the implementation of their pioneering corporate 
governance findings   and to make sure that the real targets are achieved (Hampel, January 1998, 
pp. 1,8).  
    Many corporate have this committee internally. Honeywell corporation for example has a 
committee called “Corporate Governance and Responsibility Committee”, that is responsible for 
reviewing the governance charter annually and recommending the needed changes (Honeywell , 
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2015). According to the IFC, the role of the committee is to assess the governance performance 
of the board of directors (IFC, 2010) 
      Many media corporations as well include this committee. In Thomson Reuters Corporation 
there is a corporate governance committee in charge of reviewing the corporate governance 
guidelines and recommends changes, accordingly. It helps the board to review the effectiveness 
of its committees and of its own self on annual basis. Mandate of this committee in Reuters 
comprises evaluating the need for new directors as well as indicating the skills and competencies 
that the board of directors should possess. (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
      This committee plays different roles in other corporations; the most popular is the 
nomination of new directors, to make sure they are selected in compliance with the corporate 
governance rules and guidelines. It recommends candidates for directors’ vacancies and 
determines the need for independent directors, as well (IFC, 2010).  
       The same pattern takes place in some media corporations; In the Guardian, the nomination 
committee is composed of all the non-executive directors and it recommends the board members 
selections and ensures that the agreed upon corporate plans regarding new appointments on the 
directors and management levels, are in place (Guardian Media Group, 2012).  In the British 
Broadcast Corporation (BBC) the board can’t make any new appointments, except those 
proposed by the nomination committee and approved by the Trust. Like the Guardian the 
committee is composed of a majority of non-executive and chaired by one of them (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006). In Reuters as well, the mandate of the 
corporate governance committee comprises wide range of responsibilities; it is in charge of 
recommending board candidates and re-nomination, it determines whether it is appropriate or not 
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for a director to remain on board after changing his or her main occupation. It is responsible of 
preparing a board succession plan according to the shareholders interests. It recommends to the 
board the members of other committees. Added to this, the corporate governance committee 
reviews the directors’ reimbursement expenses on periodical basis as well as ensuring that the 
needed procedures are taken to provide directors with suitable opportunities for continuing 
education (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
B- Indicator Application in Egypt:  
 
     Applying this to state-owned entities is of no difference; according to the OECD guidelines of 
state-owned enterprises (SOE); the boards of SOEs can establish a nominations committee to be 
in charge of co-operation with the ownership body in the board of directors’ nomination (OECD, 
2005). Nothing in the national press institutions laws and regulations prevents establishing such a 
committee; the board of directors has the right to establish any supporting committee when 
needed (Ibrahim E. , 2015).  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
There isn’t any applied corporate governance system inside Al-Ahram, therefore there such a 
committee does not exist. 
D- Recommendations 
- It is highly recommended to establish a governance and nomination committee as soon as a 
corporate governance system is applied to the SOPIs, because the system will need to get regular 
modifications and a separate body will be needed to maintain the system in an effective manner.  
 
Indicator2: Explicit BOD Mandate  
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A- Description: 
      In order to understand the behavior of a company and set its regulating policies, recognizing 
the role of the board of directors is important (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2008, p. 44). It is 
therefore an essential requirement for good corporate governance to have a written chart with the 
BOD duties and responsibilities. The boards of SOEs should be appointed with a clear mandate, 
a mandate to translate its responsibility for the performance of the company (OECD, 2005, p. 
47). These responsibilities should be stated in the governmental legislations and official 
regulations, the charter of the company and in the ownership policy (OECD, 2005, p. 47). 
       All the well established media corporate have a clear mandate for their BOD, written among 
their corporate governance guidelines. In Thomson Reuters, the BOD mandate determines its 
responsibility for overseeing the effective operation of the corporate governance system. Its 
major responsibility is to supervise the company’s business management while ensuring creating 
a value for all shareholders and keeping a fair reporting system to all of them as well as to the 
interested parties. Reuters BOD role is to maintain internal control over financial and disclosure 
procedures. As in to meet its duties, the Reuters governance chart states some responsibilities 
that include, and are not limited to appointing and supervising the chief executive officer and 
senior management, risk management, strategic planning, financial reporting, approvals of 
annual budgets and financial statements, periodical review of corporate disclosure policies and 
governance approach, and establishing the needed committees and setting their charters and 
delegation statements.  It sets as well the evaluation process for the board and its committees and 
reviews their compensation plans and it arranges for all the meetings of all directors and 
committees to be held as scheduled (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
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         The Washington Post Company defines the role of its BOD as the ultimate decision making 
body of the corporate that is in charge of overseeing all its activities for the sake of building 
shareholder value on the long term. Its decisions comprise, but are not limited to choosing the 
senior management members and supervising them while assuring that the Washington Post 
Company has the proper executive management (Washington Post Company, 2004). While The 
New York Times Company states that the main responsibility of its BOD is to make its business 
judgment according to what the board members believe is the best for the company and its 
stockholders (The New York Times Company , 2014). The Guardian Media Group is more result 
oriented in defining the responsibilities of its board; as it states that it is collectively responsible 
of the long term success of the company. BOD description is stated under the title “Leadership” 
in the corporate governance guidelines that is provided to the investors, and leadership 
determinants and requirements are reflected in describing the rest of the BOD duties that 
comprise entrepreneurial leadership. It states the importance of setting clear boundaries between 
the decisions that must be taken by the BOD and those that can be delegated to the management 
(Guardian Media Group, 2014) 
      The BBC has a system that can be described as a dual board system as it is run through two 
boards that are both public interest oriented due to the BBC ownership type. The two boards are 
the BBC Trust and the Executive Board. Main roles of each board are stated clearly and in detail 
within the BBC governance disclosed documents. According to these documents, the two boards 
have different mandates. The Trust is the guardian of the public interest that gives the direction 
for the strategic planning including its priorities as well as overseeing the executive work. Its 
responsibility for taking care of the public interest is interpreted into a lot of minor consequent 
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duties, one of which is overseeing the license fee revenue that is paid by the public who are the 
main beneficiaries of the BBC service (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
        This indicator is satisfied to an extent in the SOPIs regulations of Egypt; The assignment 
letters for both the chairman and the editor in chief describe the mandate of each of them (Rizk, 
2015), this is beside the general mandate stated by the press laws. Article 50 of the 1996 law 
states that the BOD mandate comprises putting the general policies of the institution, managing 
its treasury and putting its investments plans, taking all the decisions and procedures, issuing the 
human resources regulation and reporting them to the Supreme council as well as reporting the 
general budget. The SOPIs, boards are responsible, as well for overseeing the chairman 
suggestions regarding decisions related to the editorial staff, the general assembly or the 
Supreme council that will be replaced by the NPO. It is in charge of periodical following up on 
the institutional activity (Press Law 96 of 1996 ).  
       Based on the previously mentioned, the current press laws comply with the good corporate 
governance requirement of clear BOD mandate; however more needs to be done for the mandate 
to be effective as it stumbles over many obstacles. The obstacles include the gap between the 
regulations and implementation as in some SOPIs the BOD meetings are cosmetic and decisions 
are solely taken by the chairman (Hany, 2015). A second obstacle is the intersection between the 
BOD and the general assembly. The general assembly plays a supervisory role that it shouldn’t 
play (Elgallad, 2015). 
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     According to the Code of Corporate Governance of the Egyptian Stock Market, the general 
assembly is the assembly that constitutes all the shareholders (Egypt Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2005). Giving the authority of the owners to an assembly constituted of employees 
leads to a problem as it is completely against what should be done (Elgallad, 2015).  
      As boards of SOEs must carry out their duties according to the enterprise objectives (OECD, 
2005, p. 48), and as the chairman mandate should comprise achieving the goals that are set 
annually  (Rizk, 2015) , each NPI needs to set a separate and more detailed mandate of its BOD. 
This mandate should be assessed and regularly updated.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
Al-Ahram should abide by the board mandate that is identified by the press laws, but the BOD 
does not have a specified mandate that is developed by its members. Same thing regarding the 
chairman’s mandate, as no written internal mandate other than that stated by the law. 
        Although all board members should act as one body, Al-Ahram chairman acts solely on 
many aspects, some are according to the regulations and some are not. The chairman only 
receives the internal auditor’s reports and he sends them on his own to the external concerned 
entities (Farahat, 2015) without providing the board with these reports (Galal, 2015).  
     Although the whole board should be responsible for its decisions, but in some times no voting 
takes place in board meetings on topics that are considered settled, voting takes place only when 
there is a disagreement (Ibrahim E. , 2015). Most of the decisions taken by the board are those 
that the chairman favors, it rarely happens that the board votes on an answer that the chairman 
disapproves of (Galal, 2015).  
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      There is an evident gap between the law and its implementation, as for example according to the 1996 
law (article 66) the editor in chief is responsible of putting the editorial policies according to the general 
policies that are made by the board, however in Al-Ahram, the board doesn’t discuss anything related to 
the editorial policies due to the sensitivities between the chairman and the editor in chief (Ibrahim E. , 
2015).  
D- Recommendations 
- The law needs to modify its definition to the mandate of the BOD, according to what is 
taking place on the real ground. 
- There should be mechanisms to guarantee implementation of the mandate that is stated 
by the law 
- Policies are needed to guarantee that the right voting process takes place inside the BOD 
and that the BOD decisions are those of the majority of the members not only of the 
chairman.  
- Every SOPI should have an internal mandate for its SOP, according to its objectives that 
its board members agreed upon.  
Indicator3: Explained CEO and Chairman Offices Policies  
A- Description: 
 
      The separation between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman positions 
has been a matter of debate. The decision in this regards is still a controversy in publicly 
traded companies and among shareholders and BODs. Many corporate governance 
general codes require an explanation of the board structure of the company with regards 
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to reasons of separating or not separating the positions of the chairman and CEO. 
(Tonello, 2013)  
        Media firms don’t hold onto a unified policy regarding the CEO and chairman 
positions separation. The policies of The Guardian Media Group state clearly the 
distinction between the role of the CEO and that of the chairman with written separate 
duties that is agreed on by the board (Guardian Media Group, 2012). Thomson Reuters 
maintain the CEO position as well (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  On the other side, the New 
York Times Company does not have a certain policy regarding this issue as its board 
believes that policies should be flexible and decision is to be taken according to the 
circumstances (The New York Times Company , 2014). The BBC approves the existence 
of the CEO position, but under the name of the director general of the BBC who is an 
executive member in the executive board and might be its chairman (British Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006) 
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
      The position of the CEO does not exist in any of the SOPIs structures. SOPIs only have a general 
manager who does executive work, but he can’t be considered a CEO. The job of the general manager 
is limited to executing the chairman’s orders and decisions, and he might not even be a board 
member, if he hasn’t got elected or appointed by the chairman (Elgallad, 2015). And the Egyptian 
code of corporate governance does not use the term “CEO”, however it tackles the 
importance of separating the chairman position from the managing director, and in case of 
not separating them an explanation should be made and a non-executive vice-president 
should be designated (Egypt Code of Corporate Governance, 2005).  
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     The questions of separating the CEO and the chairman positions in press institutions 
doesn’t have a model answer, it depends on the available calibers and the organizational 
nature of the institution, even in privately owned press companies in Egypt there isn’t a 
unified pattern (Kassem, 2015). More importantly is having a specified chain of commands 
to the chairman and whoever works with him, whether a CEO or a Vice chairman (Hamzawi, 
2015).  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
    Al-Ahram SOPI board does not comprise a CEO or any close position as a vice chairman, or 
managing director. There is only a general manager who can’t by any means be considered a 
CEO or vice chair and the chairman is not obligated to appoint him on the BOD (Ibrahim E. , 
2015) (Farahat, 2015).  
D- . Recommendations 
- In fulfillment of this indicator, it is recommended to conduct studies on the need of our 
SOPIs to having the position of CEO, or not and to determine whether a unified policy is 
to be set for all the institutions or it is preferred for every institution’s board to make its 
decisions independently according to its set goals and targets.  
- The adopted agency governance approach should be considered here, as it strongly 
supports the separation between the CEO and the chairman.  
- Selected policies in this regards need to be explained to the owner’s representative and 
other stakeholders and it should be disclosed to the public.  
- After deciding upon the SOPIs policies in this regard, an exit door needs to be set.. 
Because corporate governance policies might get changed by practice. 
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-  And it is useful to refer here that the BBC CEO who is called the director general as 
previously mentioned, may also be the editor-in-chief of the corporation (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006), which adds another suggestion for our 
institutions, that is practicing the CEO role by the editor in chief. On the other side, it is 
common for the publisher to be the CEO at the same time (Kassem, 2015) 
 
Indicator 4:  Inclusion of Independent Directors in the BOD 
 
A- Description: 
 
        For the past two decades, the inclusion of independent directors on BODs has been the 
golden given of modern corporate governance (Wheeler, 2013). Directors’ independence mainly 
means independence of the executive arm of the corporate as independent directors are expected 
to act as trustees of the shareholders (EY, 2015). The corporate governance code of Singapore 
describes independent directors as the strong element on the board that is capable of practicing 
objective judgment; it adds that an independent director shouldn’t have any relationship with the 
company or any of its employees as his main role is to monitor the corporate policies, checks its 
strategy and calls for information whenever needed to complete the missing parts in the picture 
(Singapore Institute of Directors, 2007) 
      Most of the corporate governance codes agree on the importance of the inclusion of 
independent directors in the BODs, the code of Singapore states that not less than one third of the 
BOD should be independent, while a company like the Guardian life insurance company states in 
its corporate governance charter that not less than two thirds of its BOD should be independent 
directors as well as all the committees (Guardian, 2015) 
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       Most of the well established media entities apply the rule, even those who have exeption 
rights according to the corporate governance codes of their countries. The Thomson Reuters 
Company governance rules state that its board believes that independent directors should 
comprise at least half of the BOD, affirming that the Company is best served and the 
shareholders interests are safeguarded by a BOD that acts independently of management 
(Thomson Reuters , 2014) 
        According to the Guardian Media Group governance rules, a senior independent director 
should be chosen by the board, that should comprise a mixture of executive and independent 
non-executive directors aiming to have at least half of the board members of the non-executive 
directors, to protect the board from any group domination that may negatively affect its decision 
making (Guardian Media Group , 2013, pp. 3,4). 
     Despite its exemption from this requirement on the grounds that it is a controlled company, 
The Washington Post states in its governance documents that the majority of the directors who 
comprise the company’s board are independent (Washington Post Company, 2004), as an 
implication that shows the importance of this requirement as a major indicator for good corporate 
governance.  
      According to the BBC charter, the corporation Trust acts separately from its executive board 
as they are prohibited from acting together as a single body on any of the corporation functions. 
Although the BBC Trust enjoys the independence needed for being capable of best serving the 
public interest and safeguarding the rights of the license fee payers, who are among the main 
stakeholders for the public media entity; however the charter doesn’t consider this enough in 
compliance with the independent director requirements, as it adds that the executive board 
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should comprise independent non-executive directors as well. The number of the non-executive 
directors on the executive board, according to the charter, should not be less than one third and 
not equal to or more than one half of the board (British Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, 2006) 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt:  
     Applying this corporate governance requirement is not the only guarantee to ending 
corruption (Wheeler, 2013), however it is an important requirement that makes the process 
easier. State-owned entities are not apart from this.  
     According to the OECD, SOEs should have a sufficient number of independent non-executive 
board members; it suggests hiring them from the private sector (OECD, 2005, pp. 49,50). And 
The Egyptian corporate governance code states that the BOD should comprise a majority of non-
executive directors with a variant range of skills (Egypt Code of Corporate Governance, 2005).  
      Nothing in the current press laws prevent the existence of independent, non-executive 
directors in the BOD s, however the current laws application can never result in a satisfying 
number of independent directors. The 1996 law states that the BOD of the national press 
institution should be composed of six elected employees and six appointed, given that four of 
them should be from the institution (Press Law 96 of 1996 ). This means that the chance of 
having directors who are independent from the management and from the press institution is 
limited to two directors.  Akhbar Elyoum for example has one independent director and 12 
executive non-independent directors who belong to the management, while its general assembly 
comprises more independent members (Rizk, 2015). The media expert, Hisham Kassem, says 
that the majority of the board members should be non-executives (Kassem, 2015). However A 
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stumbling rock in front of the satisfaction of this indicator is the lack of efficient calibers. The 
chairman of Akhbar El-youm institution refers the composition of the BOD from a vast majority 
of executives to the need of putting the best calibers in both the top management and on the BOD 
(Rizk, 2015). It is therefore, in order to satisfy this indicator, a change in the press laws is 
needed.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram: 
   All members of Al-Ahram board are executives; none of the BOD is independent (Galal, 
2015). It is not eligible to appoint board members from outside the institution (Farahat, 2015). 
The needed expertise can be compensated by hiring consultants and advisors, as the chairmen 
has the full authority to so (Galal, 2015). Independent members, as public figures and 
intellectuals can be appointed on the general assembly, but not on the board (Ibrahim E. , 2015).  
     This system makes Al-Ahram very far from complying with this CG indicator 
D- Recommendations 
- The law needs to be flexible enough to let each SOPI board decide upon its need to 
independent directors.  
- Research needs to be conducted to identify the minimum and maximum numbers of 
independent directors needed on the SOPIs boards.  
- Independent directors need to be selected upon the need of each SOPI to certain expertise 
and qualifications, selection shouldn’t be made haphazardly.  
- Reasons for selecting each independent director should be disclosed to the owner’s 
representative and other stakeholders.  
- All of this can’t be achieved without periodically defined targets.  
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Indicator 5: Effective Board Size (Effective board size determinants)  
A- Description: 
 
     The board size differs from a corporate to another, while determinants of the ideal size have 
been an issue of debate by scholars as well as practitioners. Different results were reached by 
both; however they agreed on the important role that the board size plays as it affects the BOD 
incentives as well as the board effectiveness (Raheja, 2005). 
       There is no universal agreement on the optimum size of a board of directors (Investopedia 
staff , 2003); however media entities make sure to reach an optimal sized board. The Thomson 
Reuters company governance documents state that the board currently thinks that its optimal size 
should range between 14 to 16 members in order to achieve effective decision making process 
and for the sake of effectively functioning committees (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
     The usage of the statement “the board currently thinks” by The Reuters company, means that 
board size rules are subjected to change maybe according to changing circumstances, like new 
added objectives or as a result of assessment results that might advise to increase or decrease the 
board size. This is evident as well in the Washington Post Company as the board contains 11 
members; however the company ensures the authority of the board, according to the governing 
ruled, to change its size whenever it thinks that change is needed (Washington Post Company, 
2004).  
      The BBC charter states the same, as the executive board size should be determined by the 
board itself and approved by the Trust, while abiding by the general rules of having a minimum 
number of 4 independent directors (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
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    Unlike the previously mentioned media firms, the Guardian Media Group states that the board 
comprises 11 directors including the chairman, without a mention to anything related to 
flexibility in changing this board size (Guardian Media Group, 2012).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
       Experience shows that the smaller the BOD gets the more effective their strategic 
discussions get (OECD, 2005, p. 52). According to the OECD, SOEs boards should 
evaluate the board size effectiveness regularly (OECD, 2005, p. 48).  
    All of the previously mentioned models, statements and rules indicate the importance 
of setting a suitable board size for effective corporate governance, but they indicate at the 
same time that this is something to be decided by each firm separately.  
    The Egyptian press laws identify a unified board size for SOPIs which is 13 including 
the chairman (Press Law 96 of 1996 ).  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
    The interviewed board members agreed that the board size that is identified by law is suitable 
and effective.  
D- Recommendations 
- In order to comply with this indicator the press laws need to leave the board size decision 
to the SOPIs board members 
- Periodical assessment to the board size should take place  
-  Each SOPI should have the flexibility of changing its board size according to the 
periodical evaluation results.  
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- Reasons for Board size determination should be explained in details to the ownership 
entity (owner’s representative) and other stakeholders as well as in the publicly disclosed 
annual reports.  
 
 
Indicator 6: Boards Term limit Policies  
A- Description: 
 
    A term limit policy identifies the maximum number of consecutive terms a board member can 
serve. Only 40% of public boards in the United States have term limit policies (Association of 
Governing Boards). Identifying a term limit for directors reenergize the BOD with new and fresh 
blood and lessens the probability of groups domination over the BOD decisions (Moyers, 2011), 
however keeping term limits policies might ruin the memory of the place and makes the 
company lose important calibers (Association of Governing Boards).  
    Media firms don’t agree on a unified policy regarding BODs term limits as some media firms 
set limits and some don’t.  
       The Thomson Reuters board does not hold onto putting any term limits to its directors as all 
directors assignment is endured until decided otherwise by the shareholders or until their 
resignation. Reuters’ governance rules do not set a mandatory retirement age for its directors, on 
the notion that sending its board members on retirement deprives the company of the persons 
who contributed to its success, development and strategy (Thomson Reuters , 2014). While the 
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Washington Post company sets a retirement age of 75 years old, while ensuring that no limits are 
set for the number of terms (Washington Post Company, 2004).  
   The BBC governance system is different than all the previously mentioned systems, as the 
term limits of the chairman, vice-chairman and Trust member shall be specified in the 
appointment order, however the specified appointment period should not exceed 5 years and 
after the appointment period ends, they can be re-appointed to any further period that does 
not exceed 5 years (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006) 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
          In SOPIs there the term for the chairman and other members is 4 years, re-appointment can take 
place for unlimited times.  
    The 1996 press law (article 61) states that the retirement age of any of the employees of the national 
press institutions, including the chairman and BODs is 60 years, however the shura council, that is 
currently replaced by the SPC, can approve the extension of the retirement age of the chairmen and the 
editors in chief year by year until the age of 65 maximum (Press Law 96 of 1996 ). The newly 
proposed press law states the age of 65 as a retirement age for journalists only (Hany, 2015) . 
The current press law states that board membership term is 4 years that can be renewed (Press 
Law 96 of 1996 ).  
     According to the Egyptian code of corporate governance, the term of an executive board 
member must not be more than 3 years; otherwise reasons should be explained to the general 
assembly (Press Law 96 of 1996 ).  
 
C- Application in Al-Ahram 
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     SOPIs board members term limit is 4 years. Being state owned makes Al-Ahram 
incapable of changing this. But the exceptional situation that took place in the last four 
years lead to changing the appointed board members more than 6 times due to changes in 
chairmen who are changed with the change in presidency, as previously explained in the 
problem definition section. 
    Every new chairman uses his right to appoint 6 members in his board, so he terminates 
the board members who were appointed by the preceding chairman.  (Galal, 2015). 
D- Recommendations 
-  According to the previously mentioned, there are term limit policies in the current 
governing laws of national press; however these policies need to be revisited. 
-   Deep studies need to be made to determine whether it is beneficial for the SOPIs to have 
term limitations and fixed retirement age for their BODs or not. 
- It is recommended to set term number limitations to the chairman and appointed board 
members; while exceptions should be approved by the board members and the ownership 
entity (the owner’s representative).  
Indicator 7: Specified qualifications for directors selection  
A- Description: 
     Good corporate governance begins from the top. Accordingly it is important that companies 
have directors with the appropriate skills (USCIB, 2015). Finding the directors with the required 
skills is critical in a competitive business (PWC, 2013), as investors (or owners) make sure that 
the directors constituting the bard are qualified for risk management and for strategic decisions 
(Nili, 2015 ).  According to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for state owned 
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enterprises, the nomination of SOE boards should depend on a wide range of set skills, 
experience and competencies (OECD, 2005, pp. 29,30).  
        Same applies to media corporate. Most media corporate governance rules stipulate the 
importance of putting precise qualifications and skills for directors and updating these 
requirements periodically, based on annual assessments as well as the media corporate new 
objectives and strategies. The Guardian Media Group states in its corporate governance 
guidelines that the nomination committee should write a detailed description of the required 
qualifications and capabilities for new appointed directors; and this is based on previous 
evaluations to the board. And As a general requirement, the ability of sufficient time dedication 
is a main thing (Guardian Media Group , 2013). On their annual report, the Guardian Media 
group should assure the possession of the company directors of a wide range of experiences in 
business and relevant fields (Guardian MEdia Group , 2014). In the New York Times as well, the 
nominating and governance committee is assigned to review the directors’ requisite skills on 
annual basis with regards to the company’s purpose, values and mission (The New York Times 
Company , 2014). The NYTC doesn’t put hard limitations for its nominating committee, as it 
only requires the new director to be at least 18 years old and at least one board director should be 
a US citizen and NY resident (NYTC Board Of Directors, 1988). These broad requirements put 
the entire burden on the nomination committee. Thomson Reuters corporate as well puts broad 
lines to the committee, its governance guidelines state that recommendations should be based on 
business experience, integrity, previous achievements and the skills and talents that the 
committee thinks are needed and sufficient time dedication is a must (Thomson Reuters , 2014). 
The Washington Post company underlines the importance of high personal ethics, integrity, as 
well as designing the board requirements while taking into consideration the importance of 
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achieving diversity; while asserting on acting on all of this within the board needs. (Washington 
Post Company, 2004). 
       The public purpose of the BBC has an effect on its description of the required qualifications 
in directors; it states that every board member thouls have knowledge of the culture and 
characteristics and affairs of the people in the nation, assuring the importance of the director’s 
closeness to the public opinion in that nation (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
2006).  
B- Indicator Application in Egypt:  
 
       The Egyptian press laws and regulations don’t contain any statement concerning the skills or 
qualifications that should be realized in the SOPIs board of directors. The law only set a 
representation scheme to the board members; as article (64) in the 1996 press law states that the 
BOD consists of six of the institution employees, two to represent the journalists, two to 
represent the administrative employees and two to represent the labors (Press Law 96 of 1996 ).  
        Among the major problems of selecting the BOD members in Egyptian press institutions is 
that the selection of the chairman himself lacks any definite criteria, the selection has always 
been a kind of a political reward, the thing that resulted in many chairmen who lack any 
managerial knowledge and skills (Kassem, 2015).  
     The SPC did not disclose any clear criteria regarding its last appointments to the BOD 
chairmen of national press institutions (Alahram Al-Arabi, 2013). Every chairman selects the 
appointed BOD members according to his own criteria that he is not asked to declare.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram: 
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    No specified qualifications are identified for the appointed board members and the 
reasons for their selection aren’t explained. Regarding the elected members, they are only 
identified by their representation as there is a representing quota for each of the 
journalists, administrative employees and labors without any further identified 
requirements (Ibrahim E. , 2015).  
     The currently appointed board members include the editor in chief of Al-Ahram 
Hebdo, the managing director of Al-Ahram advertising agency and Al-Ahram general 
manager, the managing editor. It is beyond the scope of this study to make individual 
assessment to each board member, but regarding their resumes they appear to be strong 
calibers, however requirements and needed qualifications should be developed regarding 
each director and selection reasons must be explained. Therefore it can be concluded that 
al-Ahram is far away from fulfilling this indicator.  
D- Recommendations 
- In order to satisfy this indicator, the suggested governance and nomination committee 
should be made and put into effect.  
- Before establishing the new committee, clear criteria and procedures need to be identified 
(Kassem, 2015).  
- Setting these criteria must be driven by the need of professional management (Hamzawi, 
2015).  
- It is recommended to  think of different specializations and qualifications that modern 
management and competitiveness require (Kassem, 2015) . 
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- As technology is becoming the backbone of any industry, and by the widespread of social 
media as one of the most important platforms for the press; we should seek directors with 
digital skills (PWC, 2013).  
- While identifying the needed criteria for directors, many factors should be taken into 
Consideration; development stage of the institution (Tonello, 2013), the assessment of the 
board that is currently in charge and the long term strategy of the institution (OECD, 
2005, pp. 29,30).  
 
Indicator 8: Board dismissal policies 
A- Description: 
 
     It is the right of shareholders, or the owning entity to decide upon dismissing a director from 
the BOD, however this should be put under clear regulations that are disclosed to the director 
before he starts his appointment, and in some companies, before he gets appointed or elected.  
        In the Thomson Reuters Company a director has to resign if he didn’t receive a majority of 
the shareholders votes on any of their meetings. The director’s resignation is to be approved by 
the board as well in order to get effective. The governance committee starts to make its 
recommendation for the replacement as soon as the board declares its acceptance to the 
resignation. The resigning director is not to attend any of the meetings of the BOD or the 
governance committee that decides upon his resignation. The board has the right to refuse the 
resignation as far as it explains the reasons in the news release that is sent to the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (Thomson Reuters , 2014) 
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       Policies in the New York Times Company are concerned with different circumstances in 
which the board director might be subjected to termination. Nominees for BODs have to accept 
in advance to resign if he or she got his place on the BOD through an uncontested election 
process. The director has to resign voluntarily from the BOD when he either retires or changes 
his or her main position. The company’s governance guidelines assert that all the previous does 
not mean that a director has to resign in all of these circumstances, but he should be willing to 
resign if he was asked to (The New York Times Company , 2014).  
   The BBC charter states the conditions on which a trust member be terminated from office. 
These conditions comprise the end of his or her appointment period, resigning, or if the Council 
terminated his appointment due to; becoming bankrupt, granted a trust deed for his creditors or if 
proven to have a mental illness admitted by hospital according to the governing regulations 
regarding mental illness. Many other reasons and termination policies are enlisted by the BBC 
charter that ensures that all these conditions apply for chairman and vice chairman as well as 
normal members. (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006) 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
       The OECD principles state that BOD termination and retirement provisions should be 
disclosed to the public (OECD, 2005, p. 49). According to the Egyptian press legislations, 
resignations of BODs and General assembly members are to be raised to the board to make its 
decision after discussion within the concerned committee and introducing a report and the shura 
council. The chairman of Akhbar Al-Youm says such an action never took place; however the 
General Assembly sometimes threatens to do so (Rizk, 2015).  
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     Resignations of the chairman and the editor in chief are to be raised to the director of the 
Supreme Council. Resignations are not to be enacted until approved by the concerned body 
(Implementing Regulations of the Press Law, 1996). Office termination of BODs is not limited 
to resignations, but the general assembly has the right to withdraw confidence from the BOD. Its 
confidence withdrawal is to be raised to the SPC (Press Law 96 of 1996 ).  
    The new proposed draft law states that the general assembly has the right to withdraw 
confidence from the BOD and raises the issue with an explanation to the NPO (Negm, 2015). 
      The current legislations don’t state specific reasons for a director or chairman office 
termination, other than those reasons mentioned for office termination for all employees. This 
can be seen as a positive thing, as it leaves a space for the internal regulations of each press 
institution to state its own policies in this regards.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
   While conducting this study, Al-Ahram BOD was facing a controversial problem 
regarding the dismissal of an elected board member. The elected board member was 
accused of fraud and forgery. Although his fraud acts were uncovered, the BOD 
witnessed an aggressive debate regarding their right to dismiss him or not. Some 
members claimed that it is not the right of the board to take such a decision and suggested 
referring the whole case to the Supreme Press Council as the owner’s representative 
while others asserted on the BOD right to dismiss this member (Galal, 2015) .The debate 
that lasted for several meetings ended up in dismissing the board member from the whole 
institution (Ibrahim E. , 2015).   
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    This debate that took place among the board members shows the absence of clear 
policies regarding board members dismissals even in severe cases of breaking the law, as 
the provided example.  
     This case showed as well the absence of the SPC role as the representative of the 
owner. As it didn’t play any role, or interfere by any means, but the entire case was 
between the BOD and the press syndicate which reveals the cosmetic role of the Supreme 
Press Council (Ibrahim E. , 2015).  
     This is an example of traditional administrative deficiencies that negatively affect the 
BOD work in SOPIs.  
 
D- Recommendations 
- It is recommended that internal regulations should state reasons for dismissing a board 
member. These reasons should not be limited to retirement or committing crimes but a 
board member should be dismissed if he or she fails to achieve certain targets. 
-  It is recommended as well for this authority to be practiced by the BOD itself and by the 
NPO as a representative of the owner.  
- Al-Ahram SOPI should have clear policies regarding board members dismissals reasons 
and procedures. New board members should be informed with these policies before they 
start their membership.  
-  The new laws need to be flexible and need to ensure the effectiveness of the new 
ownership entity’s role in this aspect. .  
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Indicator 9: Supervision, communication and access mechanisms  
A- Description: 
 
       An effective supervision mechanism is an essential requirement for a company (LI & Ya-
shuang, 2002).The board of directors is the most popular supervisory mechanism for (Dehaene, 
De Vuyst, & Ooghe, 2001).  
      The major responsibility of The Thomson Reuters BOD is to supervise the business 
management of the company (Thomson Reuters , 2014). In the BBC there is a detailed 
mechanism explanation of the trust supervision over the executive board and that of the 
executive board over the senior management. The BBC charter explains how the Trust can 
maintain its dependence from the executive board and have effective communication 
mechanisms at the same time as it states that the Trust is the sovereign body in the BBC and the 
executive board is required to act upon what it sees as compatible with the Trust’s vision (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006). The BBC charter and governance documents 
put this supervision in action in terms of clear communication mechanisms. The Trust has set a 
framework for assessing executive board’s proposals and approving them. There are clear and 
detailed communication mechanisms between the BBC staff with both, the Trust and the 
executive board. (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
    Governance of the Washington Post sets an example in access mechanisms as it provides 
complete access of board to management members. According to its mechanisms directors are 
encouraged to raise any concerns with management without any mediator (Thomson Reuters , 
2014). The Washington Post sets its mechanisms as well to make it easy for BODs to have an 
access to officers and employees (Washington Post Company, 2004).  
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B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
       The National Press management in Egypt faces a major problem, by having intersecting and 
conflicting mandates and communication mechanisms between the editorial board and the BOD. 
The conflict starts from the point of appointment, as the BOD does not appoint the editor-in-
chief, but both the editor in chief and the chairman are appointed by the same body which is 
currently the supreme press council. According to the 1996 press law, the BOD puts the editorial 
policies; however there isn’t any supervision mechanism to support this statement and the norm 
is that the BOD does not interfere within any editorial aspect. Despite the confirmation of the 
editors in chief that chairmen don’t interfere within the editorial issues, the law refers a number 
of decisions regarding the journalists to the chairman, the most important of them is approving 
the new hiring, although hiring journalists includes editorial assessment. And usually BODs 
don’t have any access to journalists who are the main creators of the institution’s product.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
      Supposedly any board member has the right to ask for making an investigation with 
any of the upper management, but his request should be approved first by the chairman, 
but, however dealing with the top management at Al-Ahram is almost limited to the 
chairman and the general manager and not extended to the rest of the board (Ibrahim E. , 
2015). Putting the BOD decisions in action is the responsibility of the general manager 
(Farahat, 2015).Board members of Al-Ahram don’t have any access mechanisms to the 
management and managers are not used to dealing directly with board members and feel 
intimidated if it happened (Galal, 2015). Ezzat Ibrahim says that he decides from time to 
time to deal with some of the senior managers on specific topics on his own (Ibrahim E. , 
2015), while Mohammad Galal says that he asked for the approval of the chairman once 
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to do this and the managers were offended by his investigative questions and raised a 
concern to the board (Galal, 2015). 
 
D- Recommendations 
- Access to senior management shouldn’t be limited to chairman, but access mechanisms 
should be adopted for board members interaction with senior managers,  
- It is recommended to state clear job description based on modern management for the 
BOD , the editorial board and senior management.  
- Clear Work Flow needs to be agreed upon by the board members. 
- This work flow should draw clear communication, supervision and access mechanisms 
within the SOPI.  
- The work flow should be disclosed and explained on special sessions to all the concerned 
parties.  
- Feedback on the workflow should be collected regularly and assessment should take 
place, accordingly to make sure that the work flow is retaining its effective mechanisms 
and benefiting all the actors, and more importantly benefiting the SOPI.  
Indicator 10: Regularity of Meetings 
 
A- Description: 
    Meetings are a fundamental mechanism for putting all the CG system and regulations into 
action. Media firms CG guidelines contain many statements regarding meetings policies. We will 
refer here to three media CG models in this regard.  
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         In Thomson Reuters, board meetings get scheduled in advance through the year beside the 
irregular meetings that directors might be invited to. It is the role of the board to arrange 
meetings for the non-executive directors without the attendance of executives and the same for 
independent directors, on regular basis. Those who have authority to call for meetings, in 
Reuters, are the chairman, Deputy Chairman, CEO or any two directors. Reuters puts guidelines 
for committees meetings as well as putting rules for setting the meetings’ agenda. Reuters CG 
guidelines comprise explanations for small details concerning meetings, as who to attend, who is 
not to attend and who has the authority to lead each meeting, the thing that shows the importance 
of meetings in the life of a corporate. The guidelines explain as well the obligation of each 
director to attend all the meetings he is asked to attend; even if he can’t attend physically he 
should participate through telephone or internet (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
        The Washington Post Company model is more flexible regarding its committees 
meetings, as its CG guidelines state that each committee is responsible for determining its 
meetings frequency and agenda according to the committee mandate. However, it sets more 
precise guidelines regarding the BOD’s meetings, like who sets the agenda, and non-
management directors meetings (Washington Post Company, 2004).  
    The BBC sets guidelines regarding its Trust meetings and the executive board meetings. Like 
Thomson Reuters, it allows participation in meetings through telephone or internet (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006)  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
     The Current Egyptian press laws comply with this indicator to an extent, as they state that the 
general assembly should have at least one annual meeting (article 44), the BOD must hold a 
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meeting at least once every month and an unscheduled meeting can be held upon the request of 
one third of the members, but still the chairman should call for it. Minutes of BODs meetings 
should be sent to the Supreme Council (Implementing Regulations of the Press Law, 1996).  
    But still the press law statements regarding the meetings issue are too general, while more 
precise and detailed regulations regarding the meetings and the attendance obligations of 
directors should be provided.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
      Board meetings at Al-Ahram are regular. They take place once every month (Galal, 
2015) and sometimes twice a month (Ibrahim E. , 2015). A good system takes place 
regarding setting the meeting agenda as each board member has the right to add a topic to 
the agenda before the meeting. And at the beginning of each meeting a paper with the 
minutes of meeting of the last meeting is distributed (Ibrahim E. , 2015). Members who 
can’t attend the meeting must introduce an accepted reason (Galal, 2015). These 
procedures make Al-Ahram completely fulfill this indicator.  
D- Recommendations 
- It is recommended for SOPIs to comply with the rules provided by the Egypt Code of 
CG, as it states rules regarding setting the meeting’s agenda and the needed documents 
that should be attached to the topics of the meeting with the general assembly (the 
ownership body). According to the same code names of the members who did not attend 
the board or the committees meetings should be disclosed in the annual report (Egypt 
Code of Corporate Governance, 2005).  
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Indicator 11: Effective BOD committees  
A- Description: 
     An effective board necessarily needs effective committees. Committees are very important in 
the decision making process in many corporate. The chairman of every board has a vital 
leadership role and the committee should be provided with high quality information (FRC, 
2011).  
        Three media models are selected to reflect their policies regarding keeping effective 
committees, The Guardian Media Group, the BBC and Thomson Reuters. In the Guardian, 
evaluation is an essential tool in assuring committees effectiveness.  Another tool is that the 
Guardian governance guidelines ensures the importance of writing details of the purposes of 
each committee as well as the terms of reference, and these terms are not for good, but they get 
reviewed and modified on annual basis (Guardian MEdia Group , 2014). In Reuters the board 
carries out its responsibilities through its committees. Each committee has a specific charter and 
is headed by an independent chair who has a specific position description. In order to ensure 
committees effective performance, committees’ charters are reviewed by the governance 
committee and by the board (Thomson Reuters , 2014). Committees in the BBC play a vital role 
as the BBC Trust, that is considered the highest governing level of the corporation, delegates 
certain functions that include decision taking. The executive board, as well, delegates some of its 
functions to its committees including decision taking (British Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, 2006) 
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
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     BODs in SOPIs don’t often practice their roles through committees. Most of the committees 
mentioned in the currently used press laws are temporary ones as a committee for preparing the 
estimated annual budget or a committee for taking decisions regarding a specific tender and very 
few committees with a fixed role like the purchasing committee (article 15) (Organizational 
Regulations of NPIs).  
 
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
      Absence of board committees is one of the fundamental organizational problems at 
Al-Ahram as it leads to a much less effective board.  Only temporary committees are 
formed based on the request of the chairman to carry limited assignments and most of the 
committees are cosmetic, this causes great efforts to result in little progress (Galal, 2015). 
Al-Ahram board suffers from centralization and committees aren’t formed almost except 
on emergencies (Ibrahim E. , 2015). 
 
D- Recommendations 
- It is recommended that committees should play a fundamental role in SOPIs boards. 
- New Press laws need to reflect this important need, as well as the internal regulations of 
each SOPI.  
-  Committees’ effectiveness must be insured, especially in big organizations like Al-
Ahram or Akhbar Al-youm where BOD can’t function effectively without organized 
effective committees. Among the tools of ensuring effectiveness of committees is regular 
feedback (appendix 3)  
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Indicator 12: Transparent nomination process of board members 
A- Description: 
 
      In the private sector, board members should be nominated through a transparent process by 
the shareholders and it must be clarified that they have to work for the good of the whole 
company not for those who nominated them (OECD, 2005, p. 49).  
      All of the media firms that are studied in this thesis conduct the nomination process through 
the nomination committee (discussed in indicator 2). We will refer in this regards to the model of 
the Guardian Media Group. The Nomination Committee of the GMG makes its 
recommendations to the directors’ vacant seats against objective criteria. Most of the members of 
the committee should be independent (Guardian Media Group , 2013). The CG papers of the 
GMG state that there should be a transparent procedure for selecting new board directors and 
diversity must be realized including gender diversity. External search consultancy might be used, 
but this external consultancy should be identified on the company’s website while clarifying if 
there it has any other connection with the company (Guardian Media Group, 2014).  
B-  Indicator Application in Egypt 
     The internal system, as well as the legislative framework of SOPIs, complies with this 
indicator regarding the nominated board directors. Half the BODs are selected through secret 
ballot. Nominations are based on representation system; as two members are elected by and 
represent the journalists; two members are elected by and represent the administrative and two 
for the labor (Press Law 96 of 1996 ). Elections take place under the supervision of the Supreme 
Elections Committee and the Supreme Press Council. But on the other side the selection process 
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of the 6 board members that are appointed by the Supreme Press Council, upon the 
recommendation of the SOPI chairman, need reconsideration. On the other side a better 
structured selection process for the 6 appointed board members is needed. It is recommended to 
select the six appointed board members through a nomination committee that makes its research 
and introduce its recommendations with attached explanations.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
   Al-Ahram abides by all the transparent election process that are mentioned in the press 
laws, however In the last elections, the election door was opened for three days only and 
it should be more, but it happened due to irregular reasons (Galal, 2015) 
      Regarding the selection of the appointed board members, the chairman chooses them and 
raises his suggestion to the SPC to approve and it is now for sure that this process is nominal, 
because the SPC doesn’t play its role as the owning entity and approves all the suggested 
candidates. As a result of this board appointments are made by one person. It can’t be said that 
the procedures lack transparency, but they lack effectiveness. 
D- Recommendations 
- It is recommended that the names of the selected directors should be declared with the 
disclosed explanation of the selection.  
- The NPO, that will replace the SPC, needs to make its decisions regarding approving new 
hiring based on studied reasons.  
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Second Dimension: Strategic Planning and Policy Making  
Indicator 13: Clear Ownership Policies 
A- Description: 
    A fundamental role of corporate governance is to organize the relationship between ownership 
and management (CFA Institute, 2013). This relationship definition includes ownership rights 
and board of directors (BOD) obligations towards shareholders in addition to ownership 
representatives.  
     All the studied media firms have clear ownership policies stated within their Corporate 
Governance (CG) documents. We will refer to one media model in this regards, which is the 
Thomson Reuters Corporation model. Reuters has a disclosed ownership statements that The 
Wooldridge Company Limited is the principal shareholder. It explains the ownership framework 
that the principal shareholder acts within as it identifies the aspects that the principal shareholder 
gets involved with in the corporation. These aspects include corporate governance, board 
effectiveness, CEO and senior management appointments and business strategy. Woodbridge 
ensures that its interests are aligned with those of other shareholders (Thomson Reuters , 2014) 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt  
       The constitution of Egypt states that the National Press Institutions (NPIs) are state-owned 
(Constitution of Egypt, 2014). The current, temporary, Egyptian Press law states that NPIs are 
independent of the executive authority and of all political parties. It adds that the state owns the 
NPIs and the Shura Council practices the ownership rights (Article 55) (Press law 96 for the year 
1996). The mandate of the General assembly as defined by the law comprises a set of roles that 
are usually practiced by shareholders or their representatives in the privately owned companies. 
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The general assembly is considered the owner’s representative (Rizk, 2015). The mandate of the 
Supreme press council that is stated in the Egyptian press law comprises, as well, another set of 
roles that are usually practiced by the shareholders or their representatives in the private sector.  
     As the Shura Council is cancelled, according to the new constitution, its ownership 
representation is delegated to the Supreme Press Council (SPC) on temporary basis until the 
National Press Organization (NPO) is established. This means that SOPIs will have more than 
one owner representative; the general assembly and the NPO.  
     According to the Egyptian Code of CG, the general assembly is the shareholders 
representative. This explains one of the fatal problems of SOPIs, which is lack of effective 
ownership policies, as the general assembly of SOPIs comprise employees and managers who 
represent their sectors, while the NPOIs employees are not the owners, the thing that ends up in 
the general assembly being a representative of the employees rather than of the owners (Elgallad, 
2015)..   
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
     Al-Ahram National Press Institution is owned by the state; and the SPC temporarily acts on 
behalf of the owner, however the institution has independent internal regulations. Many 
situations reveal that the SPC doesn’t really play the role of the owner representative, but it 
works more as a facilitator or coordinator without any effective interference (Ibrahim E. , 2015) 
     Although the state is the NPIs owner, however it doesn’t allocate significant budget for the 
sake of funding Al-Ahram. And providing some NPIs with some fund after the complicated 
financial situation was regarded as an exception (Farahat, 2015).  
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    The problem of the general assembly mandate is its irrelevance to its members’ motivators. 
Board directors (BOD), especially the appointed ones, revealed an existing conflict between the 
BOD and the elected members of the general assembly. General assembly elected members are 
only motivated by getting elected and re-elected, he or she is in continuous conflict with the 
BOD without considering any administrative problems or hard financial situations (Farahat, 
2015). 
    Therefore it can be concluded that, Al-Ahram lacks effective ownership policies that are 
capable of solving the conflict between the BOD and the general assembly and of putting the 
SPC authority into effect.  
D- Recommendations 
- Only one representative to the state as an owner must be identified 
- Deep research needs to  take place to identify the best representative for the state as an 
owner  
- Clear Ownership policies are needed to organize the relationship between the state as an 
owner and the SOPI boards in a way that ensures the boards independence and at the 
same time delegates the ownership authorities to the right body.  
- The ownership policies should be developed while taking into consideration that the state 
is one of multiple stake holders 
 
Indicator 14: Adoption of Strategic plan  
A- Description: 
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      Putting strategic objectives is among the corporate governance determinants (ITE, 2008) 
it is the role of both, the BOD and the executives to contribute in the strategic planning of the 
company upon its benefit and the interest of the shareholders.  
    Putting a succession plan for both the BOD and the senior management that we previously 
mentioned is part of the strategic planning. The New York Times Company obligates both 
the senior management and the BOD to make sure short-term and long-term succession plans 
are taking place (The New York Times Company , 2014). In the Guardian the board is 
responsible for setting the strategic aims and the non-executive directors should help in 
producing proposals regarding the company strategy. In Thomson Reuters it is the role of the 
board to adopt a process for strategic planning (Thomson Reuters , 2014), The BBC charter 
makes it clear that the Trust is responsible of setting the strategic direction (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006) 
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
      Boards of state-owned enterprises should be qualified to practice strategic guidance 
(OECD, 2005). In the SOPIs there is annual financial planning, but not all of them have  any 
strategic plans. Akhbar El-Youm is a model for an SOPI that introduces a short term and 
long term strategic plans. The chairman of Akhbar El-Youm introduced a strategic plan for 
the year 20/20. The plan discusses the change in Akhbar El-Youm roles and added services 
and media platforms to the SOPI; the 20/20 plan includes having Radio and TV platforms 
alongside the digital and print platforms (Rizk, 2015). But nothing obligates a chairman or 
board of directors of an SOPI to make a strategic plan. BOD makes the general budgets and 
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the general assembly approves it, but most of the time neither the budget setting nor the 
approvals is based on a clear strategy. 
  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
      There isn’t any disclosed strategic plan other than the annual budgeting plan that 
shows where the institution is heading to. But due to the confusion that Al-Ahram is 
suffering from since the 25th of January uprising, there aren’t any serious long-term 
strategies that take place, except for separate plans for specific topics, like long term 
plans regarding plans regarding paper supply and Al-Ahram Canadian University 
(Ibrahim E. , 2015).  
    It was noticed that some board members work individually on some strategic plans, but 
these efforts are not put into an organized work that ensures its effectiveness.  
D- Recommendations 
- It is highly recommended for the new press laws to obligate the boards of the SOPIs to 
develop long term strategies. 
- These strategies need to be approved by the ownership entity.  
-  Evaluation of the BOD performance should be against what they achieved of these 
strategies.  
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Indicator 15: Risk Management Policies   
 
A- Description: 
       Risk management is defined as knowing the risks, evaluating and prioritizing them (GARP, 
2012) , after the financial crisis corporate began to pay attention to risk management (OECD, 
2014) because without risk management corporate may fail and the solution is in risk governance 
(GARP, 2012).  
     Not all media firms give due care to risk management and mention it among its governance 
rules and procedures. However, The Thomson Reuters board is obligated to ensure that a system 
is in place to know the main risks that threaten the business. They have to confirm as well that 
the suitable procedures are taken to manage these risks (Thomson Reuters , 2014). The BBC 
charter states that one of the Trust roles is to make sure that the executive board deals with the 
main risks (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006) 
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
      The accumulated debts on the SOPIs in Egypt and the dependence of most of it on grants 
from the government show that there wasn’t any risk management in these institutions. If the 
national press institutions were privately owned they would have declared going on bankruptcy. 
State owned press institutions are facing many risk that result from its deteriorating financial 
status, the increase of competition especially after the new constitution that makes issuing a 
privately owned newspaper much easier, they risk complete loss of credibility and brand value 
and many other risks.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
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   Risks are mentioned in the estimated annual budget that includes an official mention to risks 
like not being capable of collecting all the advertising revenue. (Ibrahim E. , 2015) 
D- Recommendations 
- It is highly recommended that urgent risk management procedures should take place. 
- Boards should be obligated by the ownership entity to introduce periodical risk 
management reports.  
- Boards should be held accountable if the SOPIs faced problems that weren’t warned of in 
the risk management reports. Explanation should be introduced.  
 
Indicator 16: Board succession plan  
A- Description: 
 
       Succession planning is the company’s mechanism to safeguard its leadership and 
effectiveness. It means that a company should have a plan for those who will replace the main 
directors on the BOD. In order to be able to make a successful succession planning, it needs to 
determine who the employees who can be potential leaders, are. Determining them is not 
enough, but they should be prepared for the awaited roles. It should consider their experience, 
personality and leadership potentials (SHRM, 1969). Successful boards are those who invest in 
succession planning and dealing with it as a high priority by developing efficient board officers 
and committee chairs (Bader, 2012) 
     Not all media firms give a mention to the existence of a succession plan to its board, or 
mention who is responsible for preparing this plan, but some media firms do. Under a separate 
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section called “Succession Planning” the Thomson Reuters company states the responsibility of 
the company’s governance committee for keeping a board succession plan that are responsive to 
the company’s needs and to shareholders interests. It ensures that a process is taking place for 
providing succession for the CEO and other BODs (Thomson Reuters , 2014) 
     The Washington Post Company makes it mandatory for the CEO to send an annual report to 
the compensation committee regarding executive management succession planning and he is 
responsible as well for recommending his successor in case he gets disabled to for any reason to 
continue with performing his role (Washington Post Company, 2004) 
     The Board of the Guardian Media Group is required to ensure that a board succession plan is 
in place. A succession plan is required for the senior management as 
so as to ensure continuous refreshing of the Board (Guardian Media Group, 2012). Despite the 
importance of having an appropriate succession plan in action, the BBC charter does not mention 
any statements regarding this aspect, except that if the chairman office became vacant the vice-
chairman will be the acting chairman until the appointment of a new chairman (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
       The code of corporate governance of Egypt does not mention any requirements regarding 
having a succession plan for the board or the senior management; however press laws make a 
statement in this regards. 
      The statement of press laws can be described as succession procedures rather than a 
succession plan. The law defines the procedures that should be taken to fill in any BOD seat that 
gets vacant before the appointment end date; it states that in case that any seat in the BOD or the 
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editorial board or the general assembly gets vacant then the seat should be occupied by the same 
means that the former member occupied it within one month. Regarding the elected members the 
law states that the first runner up who got the second highest votes in the elections should take 
the vacant place (Implementing Regulations of the Press Law, 1996) 
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
There isn’t any developed succession plan rather than the traditional regulations in this 
regards as previously explained.  
D- Recommendations 
- In order to satisfy this indicator each SOPI should develop its board succession plan. The 
plan should include studied methods to develop the promising calibers and taking due 
care of the potential leaders in all departments.  
- Talent programs need to be adopted by SOPIs to identify the most talented calibers.  
- BOD should play an important role n this aspect as it should contribute in thinking about 
its own succession plan as this helps in maintaining competent Boards (OECD, 2005, p. 
52). 
- Internal regulations need to be developed to protect the picked talents from any 
manipulation as they might be threatening to the current board members.  
Indicator 17: Competitive BOD Compensations (Remuneration + Reimbursement) 
A- Description:  
     A corporate must offer enough compensation to captivate and keep the skilled directors 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2011). There is evidence on the positive relationship between remuneration 
and performance of the board director (Lee & Isa, 2015). The director should be compensated for 
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the time he spends on board matters as well as the cost of keeping a flexible schedule (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011).  
     All media firms that have effective CG system have clear framework for remuneration and 
reimbursement for board members. We will drive three different media corporate models here, 
Thomson Reuters Corporation, The Washington Post Company and the BBC. The Reuters board 
is the body In charge of reviewing the directors’ compensation to affirm its appropriation for the 
directors’ responsibilities; they have to make sure the compensation value is competitive enough 
for attracting experienced, talented and committed board members. The CG Committee conducts 
periodical review on the BODs compensation among competitors (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
     The Washington Post has different policies in this regards as it compensates only the non-
employee directors and the full board determines the deserved amount of compensation 
(Washington Post Company, 2004).  
     Being a state-owned corporation, the BBC compensates its Trust members by a rate 
decided by the secretary of state. The BBC has a committee specialized only in remuneration 
(British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
      Media firms have reimbursement policies as well for directors, Thomson Reuters 
reimburses all directors for reasonable travel and for any expenses related to performing their 
roles on the board (Thomson Reuters , 2014). In the BBC, reimbursements are paid upon the 
secretary of state’s determination (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
     According to the 1997 press law, the board has the authority to decide upon the remuneration 
for those who are in high positions in the institution (article 37), those who are in high positions 
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essentially include the board directors. The BOD decides upon the reimbursements as well for all 
the employees (Press Law 96 of 1996 ).  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
    Most of the board members see that they don’t need to get compensated for working on the 
board, especially those selected by elections, however they do get a compensation on the 
decision of the chairman (Farahat, 2015) (Galal, 2015) 
D- Recommendations 
-  As this study adopts the agency theory gradually, it is recommended to maintain good 
compensation offer for the BOD, especially in the case of having independent directors, 
as the agency theory recommends determining the incentive compensation policies 
(Kang, Kumar, & Lee, 2996).  
 
Indicator 18: Continuing education opportunities for directors  
 
A- Description: 
    Although directors should be selected according to high criteria, continuous training remains 
an essential need. More corporate are encouraged to engage in board training programs (OECD, 
2004). A corporate chairman has to agree with each board member about his training plan 
according to his or her needs and this should take place on regular basis (FRC, 2014).  
    I n media we will refer to two corporate models that have training policies for their directors. 
The New York Times Company governance guidelines state that the corporate pays any 
reasonable expenses for an educational chance any director wants to have, NYTC calls this a 
continuous education program (The New York Times Company , 2014). In Thomson Reuters the 
106 
 
CG committee is in charge of making sure that procedures are taking place to provide BODs 
with suitable continuing education opportunities (Thomson Reuters , 2014).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
      The current press laws have general statements regarding training provision to SOPEs 
employees in general, without any reference to specific training or educational programs to the 
BODs. The 1996 law states that the BOD should put a system for sending employees on internal 
or external educational missions and for providing them with paid or unpaid educational 
vacations (article 72). The institution trains the employees on different levels and the BOD puts a 
system for training them and developing their capabilities (article 74). The law gives the 
chairman the right to approve employees training by specialized entities (article 75) (Press Law 
96 of 1996 ).  
      It can therefore be concluded that nothing in the press laws prevent providing the BOD with 
training programs.  
 
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
     Although approved by the law, the institution’s general manager said that he is not 
obligated to pay for the training of any of the board members pointing out to the 
possibility of getting accused of wasting public capital if he approved spending money on 
training the board members who are supposed to be highly trained and well educated 
(Farahat, 2015).  
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      This shows that Al-Ahram is far away even from the existing press laws that give the 
right of training to all the employees of any kind, therefore Al-Ahram doesn’t fulfill this 
corporate governance indicator.  
 
D- Recommendations 
- It is recommended to issue new regulations that make BOD continuous training 
obligatory.  
- Offering training opportunities need to be regulated in a way that does not result in a 
financial burden on the SOPIs that are already struggling of fatal financial problems 
(Amin, 2015).  
-  Regulations need to be developed to ensure that BOD comprises best calibers that 
deserve this investment (Kassem, 2015).  
 
Indicator 19: Value creation for all stakeholders  
 
A- Description: 
 
      The stakeholder theory holds upon the notion that the BOD should create an added value to 
all stakeholders and that value addition shouldn’t be limited to shareholders (Argandona, 2011). 
A good strategist must think carefully about how to create an added value for all stakeholders 
(UVA, 2010).  
    Not all media firms comply to the stakeholders theory when it comes to discussing the BOD 
added value. We will refer to four models in this regards; Thomson Reuters Corporation, The 
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Washington Post Company, The Guardian Media Group and the BBC. Reuters state that the 
main BOD responsibility is to supervise the business management with a view to value creation 
for all shareholders (Thomson Reuters , 2014). In The Washington Post the BOD is in charge of 
overseeing the company’s activities for the sake of building long-term shareholder value 
(Washington Post Company, 2004). On the other side, the Guardian is more stakeholder oriented 
as its BOD notion that applying CG principles is in the interest of all stakeholders (Guardian 
Media Group, 2012). The BBC, as a state media firm concentrates on satisfying the public 
purpose, as the BBC charter states that the Trust should do its duties in the public interest and 
particularly the interest of the license fee payers (British Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, 2006).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
     It is out of question that SOPIs boards should work on value creation to all stakeholders, and 
that their role shouldn’t be limited to value creation to the owner i.e. the state. SOPIs boards 
should mainly work for satisfying the public purpose beside the owner and other stakeholders.  
       In order to fulfill this indicator, SOPIs stakeholders need to be identified first. SOPIs 
stakeholders include; SOPIs boards and employees, National Press Organization, press 
syndicate, Parliament, judiciary, non-governmental organizations, Universities and educational 
firms, cabinet, political parties and the President. These stakeholders were defined by the 
interviewed experts as well as the researcher.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
 A consensus needs to be made first about who are the stakeholders then policies must take 
place to ensure their benefit.  
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D- Recommendations 
- A deeper study is needed to help reach s consensus about identifying the stakeholders of  
SOPIs.  
- It is recommended to develop a separate policy for each stakeholder to ensure that a value 
is added through efficient BOD practices and constant feedback mechanism. 
 
Indicator 20: Clear SOP stated mission  
A- Description: 
      The mission statement is a major indicator of how an organization sees the demands of its 
stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 2009, p. 28). It is therefore an important constituent of a good CG 
system.  
    All the studies media firms assert on the importance of maintaining the corporate mission 
as one of the viral BOD roles. Reuters, as an example assigns its board to establish the 
corporate mission and to maintain it (Thomson Reuters , 2014). The main model that we will 
refer to in this regards is the BBC model. The BBC Royal Charter states that the BBC 
mission is to inform, educate and entertain. It elaborates on this mission statement by 
explaining the BBC’s major and minor activities, means of service supply and means of 
promoting the public purpose (British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
     SOPIs don’t have any written mission statements.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
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     A trial took place to develop such a mission, however it wasn’t made (Galal, 2015) .Al-
Ahram needs to declare a mission statement that reflects its authenticity and public purpose 
orientation.  
D- Recommendations 
- It is therefore recommended that each SOPI board should be obligated, by law, to 
develop a mission statement for the institution.  
- This statement is to be disclosed on the SOPI website with explanation to all its 
determinants. 
-  The board should ensure that the SOPI mission statement is realized.  
- The periodical assessment to board activities should always take the mission statement 
into consideration.  
 
Indicator 21: Clear corporate governance approach  
 
A- Description: 
 
       There are a variant number of CG theoretical approaches, but when it comes to practice each 
company needs to have its own designed CG approach. Although the UK CG code, for example 
has a precise CG approach, it is advised that companies don’t have to abide by the provided 
approaches, but they can adopt another approach that is more suitable to their circumstances 
(FRC, 2010).  
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    WE will refer to one media model in this regards, which is the Thomson Reuters corporate 
model.  The CG guidelines state that it is the role of the board to develop Reuters approach to 
corporate governance, including developing suitable guidelines and principles that are 
tailored for Thomson Reuters (Thomson Reuters , 2014) 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
     As discussed before in the theoretical and conceptual framework sections; SOPIs don’t apply 
CG dimensions, however if we are to name the currently applied governing system of SOPIs, we 
can call it the stewardship approach.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
When Al-Ahram gets corporatized by fulfilling the good corporate governance indicators, 
corporatization needs to take place according to a certain corporate governance approach 
decided by the BOD.  
D- Recommendations 
- It is therefore recommended that the boards of SOPIs should be responsible of setting the 
corporate governance approach. 
-  It is recommended also that the newly developed approaches should go towards the 
agency approach more than the stewardship, so that corporatization can have a better 
chance to get realized.  
- Public interest approach is recommended and can be realized by ensuring the adoption of 
a stakeholder rather than shareholder approach.  
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Third Dimension: Transparency and Disclosure  
 
Indicator 22: Information Provision to Board Members  
A- Description: 
 
       Information flow is a key element for corporate success, as uninformed employees are more 
liable to being less effective and efficient. According to the (Great Boards Organization), 
information provision to directors should start before submitting the director’s name for 
nomination.  The job description of the suggested director should be reviewed with him in full 
details and he should understand all the job requirements, especially the required time 
dedication. After the election, the report suggests that the newly elected director should have an 
initial orientation for not less than three hours. The orientation is about the board’s fiduciary 
duties, its major decisions, and meetings procedures, information about the organization; like its 
mission and values, budget, strategic plans.  The orientation process, according to the same 
organization does not end by the orientation session, but this session is just a start as the 
organization believes the orientation process should continue for a year and the senior directors, 
like the CEO and chairman should be available to provide the new directors with any 
information they need to know about the organization or about their work benefits (Great 
Boards, 2004) 
     In Rosneft Oil Company, any new director should be provided with all the company’s internal 
documents within ten days only from his selection. Internal documents include the Charter, 
governing and supervisory body’s documents, the strategy, the risk management and internal 
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control system, and all other information needed by the director to do his work correctly (Rosneft 
Oil Company, 2014, p. 15). The FRC ensures the importance of the chairman role in ensuring 
that new directors had induction programs (FRC, 2011, p. 3).  
        Although the international media entities adopted good corporate governance systems at a 
later stage than many other businesses, however they adopt same rules as stated in their 
governance documents. In Thomson Reuters, new directors receive orientation documents that 
describe the entire governance structure of the corporate and its business (Thomson Reuters , 
2014). In The Washington Post an orientation program is prepared for all new directors where 
they get the needed information presented to them by the senior management. So the informing 
flow here is down to top. The presented material include, but not limited to the plans of the 
company , code of business conduct, the main officers, the auditing system. (Washington Post 
Company, 2004). The chair of the Guardian Media Group, as well is entitled to make sure that 
new directors receive personal induction (Guardian Media Group , 2013, p. 6).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
         The importance of information provision to new board members is familiar to the private 
sector in Egypt, as the code of corporate governance of Egypt states that new board members 
should be provided with all the needed information and data as this will help them function at 
their fullest extent (Egypt Code of Corporate Governance, 2005);  however the public sector is 
not familiar with this governance requirement, consequently SOPIs lack any rules or regulations 
to enforce information provision to new board members or provision of new information to all 
BODs.  
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C- Application to Al-Ahram 
   There aren’t any obligations on the chairman to provide his board members with the 
needed information and no policies are made in this regards. Information is provided 
gradually as by time board members have access to some previous reports and important 
documents, but nobody provides these things in the beginning (Ibrahim E. , 2015). There is 
a struggle between the appointed and elected board members. Sometimes the elected board 
members aren’t welcomed and consequently they don’t get provided with information until they 
prove themselves to be good (Galal, 2015).  
    It is therefore concluded that Al-Ahram does not satisfy this indicator by any means.   
D- Recommendations 
- Internal regulations need to be enacted to allow any new board member to have access to 
archived BOD meetings documents.  
- A board secretary needs to be hired and information provision should be among his or her 
main duties.  
- The right to a new board director to orientation session should be enacted by the law.  
 
Indicator 23: SOPI disclosure policies  
A- Description: 
 
       Disclosure is important for good corporate governance because it is seen as very effective in 
encouraging new regulations that enhance corporate governance. Markets and investors need 
information to enable them to make the right investment decisions. It is therefore markets are at 
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their best when they are provided with information, enough for governance evaluation. The most 
important role that disclosure plays is helping in risk assessment (UNCAD, 2011).  
        Disclosure policies have the same importance in media firms, whether they are private or 
state-owned, in privately owned media firms disclosure policies focus on the access of 
shareholders to all the needed information while those of the state-owned media firms 
concentrate on disclosing information to the public who are the main beneficiaries of the 
provided service that should be aiming at serving the public purpose. The Thomson Reuters 
board is required to revise the disclosure policies on periodical basis and to make sure that they 
are taking place as planned (Thomson Reuters , 2014). Protocols of the BBC as a public media 
entity state that the BBC acquire high standards of transparency as information provision 
includes the executive board’s proposals that are made public (British Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport, 2006) the BBC is known for publishing the highlights of its board meetings on 
its website and they are accessible to everyone. The Washington Post discloses information on 
its website as well for both shareholders and the public, the disclosed material include the 
company’s annual report (Washington Post Company, 2004).  
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
       Credible and precise data about the Egyptian press industry in general and the state-owned 
press in specific are very rare, if existed. No one knows the real distribution numbers of the 
public as well as the private newspapers and there aren’t any precise data on their revenue, debts 
and losses. Although the 1996 press law makes the annual report of the newspaper circulation, 
obligatory, none of the newspapers publish its report. The state-owned press started the violation 
first and the privately owned newspapers followed in their steps (Kassem, 2015) (Elgallad, 
2015). Minutes of BOD meetings can’t be disclosed to public, because this means revealing the 
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institutions plans to the competitors (Kassem, 2015) (Rizk, 2015). However, annual budgets 
should be disclosed (Kassem, 2015).  
 
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
    Al-Ahram discloses some documents to the SPC among which are the minutes of meeting of 
the general assembly and the BOD. The documents include sound recordings and written texts. 
But no information gets disclosed to the public who are the main beneficiaries. Neither the 
annual budget nor the minutes of meetings get a public disclosure. The institution’s general 
manager does not see this as a mean of transparency as there are many other ways to ensure 
transparent, like the internal and external auditors (Farahat, 2015).  
D- Recommendations 
- Editorial policies of each state-owned newspaper must be published on the newspaper 
website or by any of the means that make them known to the public as well as to the 
National Press Organization and more importantly to the institution employees, as the 
editorial policies must change from a national newspaper to another (Hany, 2015) 
- It is recommended to have clear explanations attached to the new press law, for the 
general disclosure policies that SOPIs need to follow to provide all the stakeholders with 
the needed information.  
- The law articles that oblige newspapers to publish their annual reports must be put into 
effect. 
- . Achieving all of this requires identifying the stakeholders and the kind of information 
that each of them need for efficient functioning. 
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Fourth Dimension: Code of Conduct   
 
Indicator 24: BOD Conflict of Interest Policy   
A- Description: 
 
     Good Corporate Governance requires the existence of a clear conflict of interest policy to 
ensure that all BOD members work for the best interest of the company (Tenenbaum & LLP).  
    Regarding application of this CG dimension in media firms, we will refer to the model of 
Thomson Reuters Company. The CG guidelines of the company clearly state that each director is 
obligated to inform the board with any potential or current conflict of interest he may have with 
the company. The Guidelines go further by stating precise regulations regarding meetings 
attendance as any director who has conflict of interest in a subject that is reviewed by the 
committee or board, he or she is not allowed to attend this meeting, unless approved by the 
committee or board. One of the important conflict of interest rules in Reuters is that senior 
managers are not allowed to serve on a BOD of an organization that employs a director on the 
Reuters BOD (Thomson Reuters , 2014). 
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
     In state owned enterprises any director who has any current or potential conflict of interest 
issue should ensure reporting it to the board and the board has to disclose these issues and give 
information on how they are dealing with them (OECD, 2005).   
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     There isn’t any direct regulation in the SOPIs legislations that fulfills this good CG 
requirement. At the same time there isn’t anything that prevents it.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
   Like most SOPIs, Al-Ahram doesn’t have a clear statement about conflict of interest, 
however its by-laws contain some separate statements regarding this issue. Al-Ahram had 
suffered from conflict of interest represented in mixing between working as a journalist and 
advertising representative as well, but now firm actions are being taken to prevent any fees or 
compensations to any journalist in return of getting advertisements. Similar action regarding 
the journalists who work as consultants to their news sources, needed procedures were taken 
to prohibit this completely (Galal, 2015).  
     But still Al-Ahram lacks straightforward policies regarding conflict of interest, especially 
for board members. 
D- Recommendations 
- It is therefore recommended to have new laws that deal with SOPIs board conflict of 
interests.  
- SOPIs Internal regulations are needed as well to set more detailed and precise rules 
regarding conflicts of interest in BODs. (Appendix 4)  
 
Indicator 25: Code of Business conduct  
A- Description: 
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     A code of conduct or code of ethics is important for clarifying the values and principles of a 
corporation in relation to its professional conduct (ECI , 2009). Board Code of conduct is a 
relatively new concept, as BODs have been traditionally governed by a group of by-laws 
(Navran, 2002).  
           The studied media firms adopt business conduct codes; we will refer here to two models; 
Thomson Reuters Corporation and The New York Times Company. In Reuters, the board adopts 
what the CG guidelines call “Code of Business Conduct and Ethics”. Reuters doesn’t have a 
specific code for its board, but it expects all the employees to abide by the code. Any exceptions 
must be approved by the BOD or by one of its committees and it must be disclosed (Thomson 
Reuters , 2014). The New York Times has several policies disclosed on its website regarding 
ethics and business conduct. It has is a code of ethics for directors, a code of ethics for the 
Chairman, CEO, Vice Chairman and Senior Financial Officers and a business ethics policy. The 
code of the directors and that of the chairman, CEO, vice chairman and senior financial officers, 
both explain the core purpose of the company, regarding news quality and distribution. The 
directors code then states the responsibilities of the directors, then explains the ethical codes 
regarding the conflict of interests, dealing with the corporate opportunities, confidentiality, fair 
dealing, proper use of company assets, complains with laws, rules and regulations, reporting 
illegal or unethical behavior and insider trading and personal loans to executive officers or 
directors (The New York Times Company, 2003). The code that addresses the chairman and 
seniors, explains the rules of ethics regarding conflict of interests, abiding to disclosure policies, 
complying to governmental laws and reporting code violations. It is worth mentioning there is a 
compliance officer who is responsible the code implementation (The New York Times 
Company, 2003). The Business ethics policy tackles many aspects that contain and are not 
120 
 
limited to; the standard of conduct, conflict of interest, corporate opportunities, gifts and business 
courtesies, fair dealing, financial integrity, insider trading, loans and political contributions and 
activities. The policy contains clear rules regarding violation of policy consequences (The New 
York Times Company, 2014). The company has a handbook called “Ethical Journalism”.  The 
handbook contains rules regarding the news practices (The New York Times, 2004).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
      The SOPIs in Egypt comply with the ethical code which addresses the ethics of journalism in 
all press organizations. This means that ethical codes in SOPIs are limited to those organizing the 
content, without any other solid business conduct.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
    Al-Ahram doesn’t have any code for business conduct. Some separate decisions and laws 
address business conduct. As an example of this the board decision of stopping any new 
hiring and dismissing the trainees who have relatives in the institution to prevent nepotism. 
Although old regulations prevented hiring workers children, however exceptions were 
always made and now Al-Ahram board is getting these old regulations in action as a part of 
the business conduct (Ibrahim E. , 2015).  
    In order to fulfill this indicator Al-Ahram needs to have clear code of business conduct.  
D- Recommendations 
- It recommended that SOPIs need to have business conduct code that is based on moder 
corporate governance attributes.  
121 
 
Fifth Dimension: Audit and Evaluation 
Indicator 26: Internal Audit Independence  
A- Description: 
 
    Internal audit plays a vital role in ensuring strong strategic risk management, CG and internal 
control (Policy Blog , 2014). The internal audit activity must be independent, and internal 
auditors have to perform their role objectively (Institutte of Internal Auditors). Media firms that 
apply good CG, internal audit plays a vital role in ensuring BODS effectiveness. 
     There should be firm regulations to guarantee internal audit independence and here we will 
refer to three media models in this regards; Thomson Reuters, The Washington Post and the 
BBC.  But it is necessary to mentions that CG guidelines of these firms discuss the audit 
committees only that deal with the external auditors’ reports, without any mention to any internal 
audit department.  In Thomson Reuters all the audit committee members must be independent 
and to ensure their independence, their compensation is limited to the committee and BOD 
normal fees, and they are prohibited from accepting any direct or indirect extra compensation 
fees from Thomson Reuters. (Thomson Reuters , 2014). The Washington Post Company has 
same exact rules and it adds some more restrictions like that none of the audit committee 
members can have a material relationship with the company (Washington Post Company, 2004). 
In the BBC the audit committee membership is limited to non-executive members (British 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).  
      There should be clear criteria for selecting members of the audit committees and here we will 
refer to the New York Times model, they should be non-executives, more than one member 
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should have relevant experience (financially literate). It sets clear written policies and regulations 
regarding the internal audit committee meetings with the external auditors, company’s secretary 
and other concerned directors. The audit committee has a written mandate that includes, but not 
limited to, considering the subjects raised by the external auditor, reviewing the annual financial 
statement, oversight on the risk management, digital development and many internal monitoring 
activities (New York Times, 2014).  
 
B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
    State Owned enterprises should have established procedures for their internal audits that report 
directly to the board and to the audit committee (OECD, 2005). According to the Egypt code of 
CG, an internal audit department is to be responsible of implementing the internal audit system. 
It should be managed by a full time manager who reports directly to the managing director and 
quarterly to the chairman (Egypt Code of Corporate Governance, 2005).  
     Unlike the privately owned press institutions in Egypt, SOPIs contain internal audit 
departments. Internal auditors are appointed and approved by the general assembly (Article 62). 
They report to the chairman (Article 5) (Press Law 96 of 1996 ). The legislative framework of 
SOPIs has a potential to fulfill this CG Indicator.  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
    There are two internal audit departments in Al-Ahram, a general sector that is in charge of 
monitoring the budget and spending and another sector that is in charge of justifying the 
spending procedures and reviews the needed approvals according to the internal and general 
regulations. These sectors have the full authority to ask for any data or documents disclosure. All 
internal auditors report directly to the chairman (Farahat, 2015).  
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    In response to the corruption cases of Al-Ahram auditors ask for complicated procedures for 
any action to ensure it is legal, and this causes the institution to be slow and irresponsive. Quick 
procedures need to be taken and policies to be made to make the administrative process easier 
and faster inside Al-Ahram.  
      According to this information, it can be said that Al-Ahram fulfills this indicator to an extent. 
D- Recommendations 
- There should be declared restrictions to legislate the internal auditor’s independence from 
management, as some law articles state activities that should be done in co-ordination 
between management and the internal audit department like the obligation of the financial 
manager to approve the internal auditing programs (Organizational Regulations of NPIs) 
(Article 5), without any manifestation to the guarantees of practicing these 
recommendations independently.  
- A research needs to take place to study the reasons of ineffectiveness of the internal audit 
of some SOPIs that witnessed corruption. 
- Balance should be kept between internal audit effectiveness and responsiveness, as after 
the 25
th
 of Jan uprising and after many corruption cases in SOPIs were uncovered, 
internal auditors and financial managers became scared the thing that lead to very slow 
procedures in all the SOPIs activities (Rizk, 2015). 
- It is recommended as well to have an audit committee to help the board in putting the 
internal audit activities into a more effective stage.  
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Indicator 27: BOD Effective Evaluation   
A- Description: 
     No significant improvement can take place on the organizational BOD or individual director 
without a proper board evaluation process (Kiel & Beck, 2006, p. 588). The evaluation mainly 
takes place on two levels, the people’s level and the process level (Osborne, 2008, p. 5). If the 
evaluation process wasn’t well implemented it can end up in a distrust among the BODs and 
between the BOD and the management (Kiel & Beck, 2006, p. 588). The US National 
association recommends procedures, by which BODs can self-evaluate themselves (Osborne, 
2008, p. 3). Many consultants and corporate provide professionals with ready-made forms for 
BOD self-evaluation   (Appendix 2)  
 
     Media corporations give due care to the BOD evaluation, here we will refer to two media 
models; The Washington Post Company and the Thomson Reuters Corporation. Reuters adopts 
the self-evaluation system as it is the role of the BOD to make an appropriate evaluation process 
for the board and its committees   Their introduced process should measure the effectiveness of 
the board and committees as a whole, but it is designed as well to introduce performance 
evaluation for each director and for the chairman, CEO and committees heads (Thomson Reuters 
, 2014). In the Washington Post Company, the evaluation is the responsibility of the 
compensation committee (Washington Post Company, 2004), which makes the evaluation 
directly connected with the reward. However this does not prevent the board self-evaluation that 
takes place on annual basis (Washington Post Company, 2004).  
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B- Indicator Application in Egypt 
      According to the OECD, the boards of SOEs should evaluate its own performance every year 
(OECD, 2005, p. 17) ; however nothing in the Egyptian code for CG gives a mention to the BOD 
evaluation, despite its great importance. The ownership body should be provided with all the 
sufficient data for evaluation and monitoring (OECD, 2005, p. 30).  
        In the Egyptian Press Laws, there are no direct obligations on the BOD, to conduct self 
assessment, or on the ownership body, to practice any consistent evaluation. The law statement is 
vague as it says that the chairman prepares an annual report concerning the institutions activities, 
the auditors’ reports and the institution replies to them must be attached, this annual report is to 
be introduced to the BOD then to the General Assembly then the SPC should be informed with 
the decisions (article 49) (Press Law 96 of 1996 ). As noticed, the word evaluation or any 
equivalent word isn’t used in the phrasing of the law.  
     Evaluation criteria are promised in the new press laws (Rashwan, 2015). The parliament 
should play a role in evaluation through periodical hearings and the BOD should be obligated to 
publish its balance sheet in order to be evaluated accordingly (Hamzawi, 2015). There should be 
an evaluation against innovation and assessment should not be limited to productivity (Kassem, 
2015). Evaluation should be according to weather the board is meeting its bench marks or not 
(Hamzawi, 2015)... There should be standardized evaluation criteria (Amin, 2015) and there 
should be a process to sort out any deviation from the stated mission (Hamzawi, 2015).  
C- Application to Al-Ahram 
   There isn’t any proper evaluation mechanism to the individual board members effectiveness, 
nor to the whole board.  
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D- Recommendations 
- In fulfillment to this indicator, it is recommended to obligate the BODs to have periodical 
self-evaluation process. 
-  BODs should be obliged to provide the ownership entity with all the documents it needs 
for evaluating the BOD, and more importantly to act upon this evaluation.  
- The whole BOD should get evaluated and the performance of each board member must 
get an individual evaluation as well.  
- The evaluation process needs supportive rules to guarantee its effectiveness as there must 
be solid results and changes made upon these evaluations. 
Implementation Limitations and Index Reliability 
 
     Implementation of a good corporate governance index on SOPIs has so many limitations. 
The first limitation is the current bylaws that deal with SOPIs as traditional state-owned 
entities. These legislations are about to be replaced with new legislations, however if the 
news press laws are an adapted version of the current press laws, then a good corporate 
governance system can’t function within the system.  
     Second limitation is the lack of knowledge in this regards among SOPIs employees and 
managers, the thing that will require a longer period of time to educate people about this 
system and what they will benefit out of it.  
     The bureaucracy and inflated capacity of SOPIs and the protection of the press syndicate 
to the right of journalists for lifelong contracts and protecting any manager of board member 
from dismissal are stumbling rocks in front of attaining a modern governance system.  
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      The absence of the political vision to the role of SOPIs in the development of the country 
and the lack of consensus among public figures and practitioners about the role of SOPIs 
make it difficult for the policy makers to put clear objectives to act upon.  
     
Conclusion 
     The problem definitions of State Owned Press Institutions (SOPI) s should not be 
limited to the question of independence as the internal system of these institutions 
constitutes a fundamental part of the problem that can be solved by adopting a corporate 
governance (CG) system that organizes the relationship between the SOPIs boards and 
the owner. CG leads to more effective Board that is capable of effective decision making 
and problem solving.  
            There isn’t only one bench mark or a model answer to what constitutes a good 
corporate governance system. Therefore a model needs to be tailored for the State-Owned 
Press Institutions in Egypt; and after tailoring this model it should be subjected to a long 
process of trials and errors until the ideal model for the SOPIs context is realized. It is 
therefore an exit policy should always be present in the policy making process.  
 
     A Stakeholder rather than shareholder approach is adopted in this study and 
accordingly the state as the sole owner of the SOPIs is considered one of several 
stakeholders and the board of directors should work on adding value to all of them and 
more importantly to add value to the institution.  
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     Among the main stumbling rocks in the way implementing a good CG system are the 
old-fashioned legislations and internal regulations that lack sufficient motivation to apply 
a good CG system as well as lacking any modern perspective to management and 
decision making.  
     SOPIs lack clear ownership policies as more than one body are identified as the 
owner’s representative, i.e. the general assembly and the Supreme Press Council (SPC), 
while a good CG system can’t take place within this duplication.  
      Although the law is clear about the SOPIs mandate, however each SOPI needs to 
have its separate internal mandate that is set by its board against the specific targets of the 
institution, the thing that is not realized in any of the SOPIs. This mandate should be 
regularly updated according to any changes in context or according to regular assessment. 
    A regular evaluation should take place as well to assess the board size effectiveness. 
Board size is indicated by the law, however these needs to be changed as every SOPI 
must decide upon the effective board size that is relative to its mandate and size.  
       Although the board nomination process is transparent, however the appointed board 
members should be selected in a more developed way, not through the sole decision of 
the chairman. The SPC approval is cosmetic, and the chairman’s selection is considered 
final. Applying corporate governance system suggests the existence of a nomination 
committee to be in charge of suggesting all the good calibers for the vacant directors’ 
seats. This committee’s selections should be based on the board’s requirements and the 
expertise needed to meet the SOPI set targets.  
      SOPIs lack any clear dismissal policies of board members,. Unless the board member 
commits a crime he or she can’t be dismissed until the end of his term. This necessarily 
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needs to be changed as board members should be subjected to dismissal at any time upon 
the board’s decision or the ownership entity. Each board member should be subjected to 
individual evaluation and if he or she was found out as not achieving the targets he was 
chosen for, then the member must be dismissed.  
     Many other changes need to take place as SOPIs need board succession plans rather 
than traditional board succession procedures. Legislations need to be changed to allow 
hiring a number of independent directors and board members should have access to 
senior management; access to senior management should not be limited to the chairman 
as the current situation.  
      Rules need to be set to guarantee that every new director will have access to 
information he needs to work effectively, as new board members in the currently applied 
system struggle until they get the needed knowledge.  
    SOPIs suffer from absence of implementation of any disclosure policies, as 
newspapers don’t disclose their annual budgets or their circulation numbers, although 
required by the law.  
        SOPIs suffer from the absence of many corporate governance mechanisms; like 
absence of long term strategic planning and risk management, absence of proper business 
code and clear conflict of interest policies.  
    The boards function in a centralized manner, mainly through the chairman while good 
corporate governance policies require delegating authority to committees. Most of the 
committees in SOPIs are cosmetic or formed for the sake of a limited purpose or project.  
      Al-Ahram Institution, despite being capable of maintaining self-funding until now, it 
is suffering from all the previously mentioned problems. The composition and on ground 
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mandate of its board of directors is very inefficient as well as being ineffective. I suffers 
from centralized decision making and operation management. It might have good calibers 
and some essential departments that the privately owned press institutions don’t have, 
however they are lead in a manner that wastes much of their value. Added to this, the 
absence in ownership policies is a source of an everlasting problem.  
    In order to be capable of adopting a good corporate governance system, the new 
awaited laws need to comprise major changes, and not only to be an adapted version of 
the current laws that proved their failure in satisfying the state owned press mandate.    
General Policies and Recommendations: 
- Deep Studies need to be conducted on the state as an owner (What are the most suitable 
ownership policies? And how to solve the duplication problem between the general 
assembly and the NPO?) 
- Board members and senior managers of the state-owned press institutions need to get 
educated about the corporate governance discipline, maybe through business tours to the 
newspapers organizations that have success stories of good corporate governance. Boards 
of state owned press constitute good calibers that exert individual efforts for the sake of 
developing their institutions; these calibers can be a good ground for implanting the new 
approach in the press institutions; as major changes in legislations must be preceded by 
education and public opinion readiness.   
- A study needs to be conducted on the gap between the SOPIs legislations and their 
application on the real ground.  
- Consensus needs to be reached about SOPIs targets. Realistic targets must be identified.  
- SOPIs stakeholders must be identified.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1  
Questions to Experts and practitioners: 
 
o Do you think we need to have state owned media? 
o What the objectives of state owned press should be? 
o What objectives are realized and what aren’t? Why? 
o Do you think applying Corporate Governance system to state owned press institutions will make 
a change? 
o In your opinion what should the BOD mandate be? 
o  Who has the right to evaluate the chairman? 
o Do state owned press institutions boards need a CEO? 
o Is there a need to independent directors? 
o How can we solve the conflict between the general assembly and the board of directors? 
o Who is the representative of the state as an owner? 
o What needs to be done for the new laws inorder to make a real difference and not to be cosmetic? 
o How can state owned press keep its independence? 
o Who should hire the editor in chief? 
o How do you see the selection process of board members? 
o Do you think the number of board members is effective? 
o Do you think a board will function better through committees? 
o Why don’t newspapers apply to any disclosure policies? How can we develop disclosure policies 
and apply them successfully? 
o Who are the main stakeholders of state owned press institutions?  
 
Questions to Al-Ahram board members: 
They were asked 27 questions, each question to investigate an indicator application.  
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Appendix (2) Board of Directors Self Evaluation Form 
 
 
Considerations 
5 
Very 
Good 
4 
Good 
3 
Ave. 
2 
Fair 
1 
Poor 
1 board has full and common understanding of 
the roles and responsibilities of a board 
     
2 board members understand the organization's 
mission and its products / p4rograms 
     
3 Str5uctural pattern (board, officers, 
committees, executive and staff) is clear 
     
4 board has clear goals and actions resulting 
from relevant and realistic strategic planning 
     
5 board attends to policy-related decisions 
which effectively guide operational activities of 
staff 
     
6 board receives regular reports on 
finances/budgets, products/program 
performance and other important matters 
     
7 board helps set fundraising goals and is 
actively involved in fundraising (nonprofit-
specific) 
     
8 board effectively represents the organization 
to the community 
     
9 board meetings facilitate focus and progress 
on important organizational matters 
     
10 board regularly monitors and evaluates 
progress toward strategic goals and product/ 
program performance 
     
11 board regularly evaluates and develops the 
chief executive 
     
12 board has approved comprehensive personnel 
policies which have been reviewed by a 
qualified professional 
     
13 each member of the board feels involved and 
interested in the board's work 
 
     
14 all necessary skills, stakeholders and diversity 
are represented on the board 
     
 
Please list the three to five points on which you believe the board should focus its 
attention in the next year. Be as specific as possible in identifying these points. 
1) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
2) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Conducted by: Carter McNamara ( (McNamara) 
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Appendix (3) Sample feedback form for a committee meeting  
 
 
Source: American Library Association (ALA) 
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Appendix (4):  Board of Directors Conflict of Interest Disclosure form 
 
 
Source: American Library Association (ALA) 
 
 
 
